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ABSTRACT  
 
Up until the beginning of this century climate change was mostly seen as an environmental 
issue, although, the issue of violent conflict has been linked to natural resources before. 
However, in the last decade the focus has increasingly shifted to connecting climate change 
with, in particular, human security. In contrast to previous debates, contemporary discussions 
put emphasis on the impacts that climate change has on human lives. Yet, it is not 
uncontroversial to what extent environmental degradation as well as carbon dioxide emission 
based economies play and have played an accelerating role. But even if ‘climate change 
sceptics’ or ‘climate change deniers’ question the credibility of climate change the reports by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) present a solid base for the 
international climate debate which is accepted and supported by the majority of academic 
experts. Nonetheless, there is significant ambiguity about what the negative consequences of 
climate change could pose on peaceful human co-existence. In 2007, specifically, it was 
brought to public attention that the effects of a warming climate, such as more intense storms, 
floods and droughts have severe impacts on the human-wellbeing, especially in more 
vulnerable areas of the globe. Experts even claimed that, in many parts of the world, climate 
change would cause dramatic impacts in the form of violent conflicts due to the decrease of 
drinking water, fertile soil as well as food. Entire states might be weakened and societies could 
collapse which might lead to severe consequences for conflict resolution institutions and 
mechanisms, human security as well as migration. 
However, findings regarding the impacts of climate change on violent conflict are highly 
controversial and sometimes even contradictory. One reason for that could be that the physical 
effects of climate change are limited to date. Furthermore, as studies from the 1990s on the 
consequences of environmental change have shown, it is difficult to disconnect the 
environmental factor from other societal and political influences that lead to conflict. 
This thesis explores the politically charged issue as well as academically controversial link 
between climate change, as one of the environmental changes, and violent conflict by providing 
a conceptual assessment of the two different bodies of literature, namely the literature on 
violent conflict and the climate change literature, before examining available literature on the 
connection of the two phenomena. Finally, the case study of Darfur is analysed with regards to 
the often misused term climate war in order to conclude that violent conflicts are caused by 
multiple factors which should not be oversimplified and therefore cannot be traced back to 
purely environmental reasons. 
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Therefore, the central research questions addressed in this thesis are: what do scholars say about 
the connection between climate change and violent conflict? Can climate change and its 
repercussions be seen as a  threat multiplier in unstable and therefore vulnerable societies? And 
can the Darfur conflict be described as one of the first climate wars? 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. RESEARCH TOPIC 
 
A critical assessment of the link between climate change and violent conflict in the context of 
sub-Saharan Africa – The case of Darfur. 
 
 
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Up until the 21st century climate change was mostly seen as an environmental issue, although, 
the issue of violent conflict has been linked to natural resources before1. However, in the last 
decade the focus has increasingly shifted to connecting climate change with, in particular, 
human security2, which embraces in its broadest sense more than the absence of violence. 
Human rights as well as good governance are crucial to guarantee human security3 . In contrast 
to previous debates, contemporary discussions put emphasis on the impacts that climate change 
has on human lives. Yet, it is not uncontroversial to what extent environmental degradation as 
well as carbon dioxide emission based economies play and have played an accelerating role4. 
But even if  ‘climate change sceptics’ or ‘climate change deniers’ question the credibility of 
climate change the reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) present 
a solid base for the international climate debate which is accepted and supported by the majority 
of academic experts5. Nonetheless, there is significant ambiguity about what the negative 
consequences of climate change could pose on peaceful human co-existence6. In 2007, 
specifically, it was brought to public attention that the effects of a warming climate, such as 
more intense storms, floods and droughts have severe impacts on the human-wellbeing, 
especially in more vulnerable areas of the globe7. Experts even claimed that, in many parts of 
                                                     
1 Cf. Zhang, D. D. et al. (2007): Global climate change, war, and population decline in recent human history. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 
2 Cf. Barnett, J. (2001): The meaning of environmental security: Ecological politics and policy in the new security 
era. Zed Books. London. 
3 Comission on Human Security (2003); UNDP (1994a). 
4 Cf. Brzoska, M. et al. (2012): Klimawandel und Konflikt. Versicherheitlichung versus präventive Friedenspolitik? 
Nomos. Baden-Baden. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Cf. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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the world, climate change would cause dramatic impacts in the form of violent conflicts due to 
the decrease of drinking water, fertile soil as well as food. Entire states might be weakened and 
societies could collapse which might lead to severe consequences for conflict resolution 
institutions and mechanisms, human security as well as migration. At the same time one of the 
prognosis was that climate change could trigger a fight between states over both costs and 
potential benefits of climate change8. A powerful example was set by Albert Arnold (Al) Gore 
Jr. in 2007 who received the Nobel Peace Prize for the documentary ‘An inconvenient truth’ 
and for his political action with regards to climate change, together with the IPCC for its 
“outstanding scientific work”9. The Nobel Committee inter alia argued that “global warming 
not only has negative consequences for ‘human security’, but can also fuel violence and conflict 
within and between states […]The consequences are most obvious, however, among the 
poorest of the poor, in Darfur and in large sectors of the Sahel belt, where we have already had 
the first ‘climate war’”10.  
However, from a conflict studies point of view every single statement above is arguable11. 
Findings regarding the impacts of climate change on violent conflict are highly controversial12 
and sometimes even contradictory13. One reason for that could be that the physical effects of 
climate change are limited to date14. Furthermore, as studies from the 1990s on the 
consequences of environmental change have shown that it is difficult to disconnect the 
environmental factor from other societal and political influences that lead to conflict15. In 
addition, scholars use different measures and methods to prove their argument. To simplify the 
matter, those scholars can be divided into two groups. The first group points out the empirically 
proven evidence in order to provide information on and/or support the link between climate 
change and human security. Preferably, those scholars use statistical analysis and comparative 
case studies. The second group, on the other hand, refers to the plausibility of assumptions 
                                                     
8 Ibid. 
9 Cf. Presentation Speech by Professor Ole Danbolt Mjøs, Chairman of the Oslo, 10 December 2007, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/presentation-speech.html, accessed 1 
December 2017. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Cf. Webersik, C. (2010): Climate Change and Security: A Gathering Storm of Global Challenges. ABC-CLIO. Santa 
Barbara. 
12 Cf. Burke, M. B. et al. (2009): Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa, in: Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences USA, No.49, p 20670-20674. 
13 Cf. Buhang, H. (2010): Reply to Burke et al.: Bias and climate war research, in: Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences USA, No.51, E186-E187. 
14 Cf. Brzoska, M. et al. (2012): Klimawandel und Konflikt. Versicherheitlichung versus präventive Friedenspolitik? 
Nomos. Baden-Baden. 
15 Ibid. 
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based on historically unique and rapid changes in the climate. Their arguments are based on 
individual case studies which provide a plausible connection between environmental changes 
and violent conflict16. But not only are the research methods and measures controversial when 
it comes to linking climate change to violent conflict, it is also questionable what the meaning 
and outcome of such connection could be and should be directed to.  
According to Floyd (2010) it is easy to see that the intense warnings from a decade ago were 
primarily used as a means to an end, namely to change the United States (US) climate policy17. 
Moreover, it is questionable how legitimate it is to admonish of a danger which is based on a 
substantial amount of uncertainty. That itself, could be seen as dangerous since connecting the 
climate change debate solely to security issues could lead to choosing wrong responses for 
climate problems which might militarize danger prevention methods. Is it in fact reasonable to 
force conflict researchers, who are already working with multiple conflict influencing factors, 
to analyse such speculative relationships18? However, at the same time, it would also be 
irresponsible to ignore climate change in the conflict debate since it is the biggest and possibly 
most relevant environmental change that humankind has been challenged with19. 
It is now widely accepted that the main cause of global warming, the increase of the earth’s 
average atmospheric temperature, and thus climate change can be traced back to human 
activity20. The amount of carbon dioxide, the crucial component of the  greenhouse gas which 
causes global warming, is primarily produced from the combustion of carbonaceous fossil fuels 
in order to generate energy. The current amount is higher than it has been in the last eight 
centuries. In fact, the trend shows an increase in the amount of carbon dioxide. The IPCC 
predicts, given that no effective counter-measures are undertaken, a temperature increase of up 
to 6.4°C by 2100. Contemporary studies show that greenhouse gas emissions are already 
causing permanent and intensive changes in our environment. Scientists have warned that 
climate change does not happen gradually, instead abrupt and irreversible climate change 
impacts can be the consequence once a certain temperature increase is exceeded. This  tipping 
                                                     
16 Ibid.  
17 Cf. Floyd, R. (2010): Security and the Environment: Securitization theory and US environmental security policy. 
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 
18 Cf. Brzoska, M. et al. (2012): Klimawandel und Konflikt. Versicherheitlichung versus präventive Friedenspolitik? 
Nomos. Baden-Baden. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Cf. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland 
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point could not only affect the adaptation potential of human society but also human security 
and therefore people’s lives21.  
Thus, over time, given rising contemporary awareness, it broadened and shifted its focus to 
become an issue in political and social debates at both, national and international levels. Effects 
are widely spread, although the chain of causation might not always be visible in the first place. 
Environmental mechanisms, ecosystems, as well as cultural implementation and adaption to 
nature are linked and interconnected too closely and are too complex to reduce climate change 
to a regional or national issue. There is international consensus in the field of academia and 
politics with regards to two fundamental prevention strategies. Firstly, it is necessary to avoid 
a dangerous and uncontrollable climate change in order to prevent potential violent conflict. 
Secondly, conflict prevention needs the development and implementation of climate change 
adaptation strategies as the consequences of climate change can already be seen22. 
Nevertheless, alarmist prognoses as well as transforming climate change into a pure security 
threat should be avoided; nor should climate change in that matter be denied or trivialized. 
Therefore, the central research questions addressed in this thesis are: what do scholars say about 
the connection between climate change and violent conflict? Can climate change and its 
repercussions be seen as a  “threat multiplier” in unstable and therefore vulnerable societies? 
And can the Darfur conflict be described as one of the first “climate wars”? 
 
 
 
1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A preliminary review of the available literature has indicated that studies have been undertaken 
to examine the linkage between climate change and violent conflict. This thesis focuses on the 
politically charged issue as well as academically controversial link between climate change 
and violent conflict by providing a conceptual assessment of the two different bodies of 
literature, namely the literature on violent conflict and the climate change literature, before 
examining available literature on the connection of the two phenomena. Finally, the Darfur 
conflict is analysed with regards to the often misused term “climate war” in order to conclude 
                                                     
21 Ibid.  
22 Cf. Brzoska, M. et al. (2012): Klimawandel und Konflikt. Versicherheitlichung versus präventive Friedenspolitik? 
Nomos. Baden-Baden.  
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that violent conflicts are caused by multiple factors which should not be oversimplified and 
therefore cannot be traced back to purely environmental reasons. 
In this thesis the term climate change is referred to as “a change of climate which is attributed 
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and 
which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”23 as 
defined in Article 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCC). As mentioned above, the IPCC report from 2007 received a lot of international 
attention due to its alarming prognosis. According to the report there is evidence that global 
warming has already affected the climate worldwide as “[m]ountain glaciers and snow cover 
on average have declined in both hemispheres. The maximum areal extent of seasonally frozen 
ground has decreased by about 7% in the Northern Hemisphere since 1900, with decreases in 
spring of up to 15%. Temperatures at the top of the permafrost layer have generally increased 
since the 1980s in the Arctic by up to 3°C”24. In addition, “[t]here is observational evidence of 
an increase in intense tropical cyclone activity in the North Atlantic since about 1970, and 
suggestions of increased intense tropical cyclone activity in some other regions where concerns 
over data quality are greater. Multi-decadal variability and the quality of the tropical cyclone 
records prior to routine satellite observations in about 1970 complicate the detection of long 
term trends in tropical cyclone activity”25. Furthermore, droughts, excessive rainfall and floods 
are likely to contribute to human insecurity. Current estimations suggest that over 300 million 
people have already been affected by climate change. Those effects include the risk of violent 
conflict due to climate change impacts26. 
Conflicts per se are inevitable and a necessary by-product of social change, however, it is a 
question of how they are handled and resolved27. In order to examine the connection between 
climate change and violent conflict the latter also needs to be clarified. When speaking of 
violent conflict in this thesis it will be referred to political violent conflict which the World 
Health Organization (WHO) defines as a form of collective violence. The WHO understands 
collective violence as “the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as 
members of a group – whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity – 
                                                     
23 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), Article 1. 
24 IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K and 
Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland. 
25 ibid. 
26 Cf. ibid. 
27 Cf. Ropers, N. (2002): Friedensentwicklung, Krisenprävention und Konfliktbearbeitung. Technische 
Zusammenarbeit im Kontext von Krisen, Konflikten und Katastrophen. GIZ. Wiesbaden 
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against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social 
objectives”28. It can take on various forms such as “[w]ars, terrorism and other violent political 
conflicts that occur within or between states”29 as well as “[s]tate-perpetrated violence such as 
genocide, repression, disappearances, torture and other abuses of human rights”30 and 
“[o]rganized violent crime such as banditry and gang warfare”31. There are several definitions 
of violent conflict, many of which are controversial. The Heidelberger Institut für Internationale 
Konfliktforschung (HIIK) suggests the following definition for political conflict: 
“[A] political conflict is a perceived incompatibility of intentions between individuals or social 
groups. Such an incompatibility emerges from the presence of actors who communicate and 
act with regard to certain objects. These actions and communications are known as measures, 
while the objects form the issues of positional differences. Actors, measures, and issues are the 
constitutive attributes of political conflict”32. 
The institute further analyses the concept of intensity and distinguishes between different levels 
of violent conflict, such as violent crisis, limited war, and war33. These relevant terms will be 
clarified in chapter three of this thesis. Furthermore, the different causes for violent conflict 
will be examined. According to the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre 
(GSDRC) those causes can be divided into political and institutional factors, identity politics, 
socioeconomic factors, and resource and environmental factors which include climate change, 
environmental insecurity and resource scarcity34. 
In addition, Homer-Dixon argues that three particular sets of theories with regards to violent 
conflict are of importance. Firstly, frustration-aggression theories which “suggest that people 
become aggressive when they feel frustrated by something or someone they believe is blocking 
them from fulfilling a strong desire”35. Secondly, group-identity theories which “aim to explain 
the way groups reinforce their identities and the ‘we-they’ cleavages that often result”36.  
Lastly, he claims that “[s]tructural theories, which are often grounded in the assumptions of 
micro-economics and game theory, explain conflicts arising from the rational calculations of 
                                                     
28 Krug, E.G. et al. (2002): World report on violence and health. Geneva, World Health Organization. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (2011), https://www.hiik.de/de/methodik/, 
accessed 3 December 2017. 
33 Cf. Ibid. 
34 Cf. Haider, H. (2014): Conflict: Topic Guide. Revised edition with B. Rohwerder. GSDRC, University of 
Birmingham. Birmingham.  
35 Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1999): Environment, Scarcity and Violence. Princeton University Press. Princeton. 
36 Ibid. 
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actors in the face of perceived external constraints”37 before he links violent conflict to 
environmental factors as well as climate change38. 
Whether environmental degradation and resource scarcity can lead to violent conflict has been 
discussed for decades. In fact, the connection between environmental change and violent 
conflict has already been investigated in the 1990s, albeit without significant and empirically 
robust findings that could prove a causal relationship39. Thus it can be assumed that 
environmentally induced conflicts are caused by a complex interdependency of different 
factors as well as amplifying effects that vary in different contexts. This complex 
interdependency of multiple different causes and influential factors has therefore led to a lot of 
criticism on the prognosis of environmental conflicts40. All in all, the current state of 
knowledge about the linkage between drastic environmental change and violent conflict can 
still be described as unsatisfactory41. With regards to prevention strategies it is also assumed 
that the probability of a violent escalation strongly depends on the different societies’ climate 
vulnerability as well as their adaptation abilities and the capacities of their social and political 
institutions42.      
Nevertheless, a substantial amount of the literature has drawn a connection between climate 
change and violent conflict, however, as previously mentioned, empirical evidence is limited 
and circumstantial. Several reports by the IPCC43, the World Health Organisation (WHO)44, 
and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)45, for example, indicate the severe 
effects of climate change on humankind. It is suggested that those findings must be included 
in order to prevent violent conflict46. At the same time, many scholars, such as Homer-Dixon 
                                                     
37 Ibid. 
38 Cf. ibid. 
39 Cf. Brzoska, M. et al. (2012): Klimawandel und Konflikt. Versicherheitlichung versus präventive Friedenspolitik? 
Nomos. Baden-Baden. 
40 Cf. Carius, T./ Tänzler, D. (2009): Ökologische Friedensentwicklung auf dem Prüfstand, in: 
Wissenschaft&Frieden, No.2, p36-39. 
41 Cf. Brzoska, M. et al. (2012): Klimawandel und Konflikt. Versicherheitlichung versus präventive Friedenspolitik? 
Nomos. Baden-Baden. 
42 Cf. Scheffran, J. (2008): Ein Klima der Gewalt? Das Konfliktpotential der globalen Erwärmung, in: 
Wissenschaft&Frieden, No.4, p49-53. 
43 Cf. IPCC (2014): Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and 
L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland 
44 Cf. WHO (2003): Climate change and human health. Risks and responses, accessed 20 October 2017. 
45 Cf. UNEP (2015): Climate Change and Human Rights, accessed 4 October 2017. 
46 Cf. Webersik, C./Levy, M. (2016): Reducing the risk of conflict recurrence: The relevance of natural resource 
management, in: Bruch, C./Muffet, C./Nichols, S.S. (2016) (ed.): Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding. New York: Routledge. 
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and Blitt (1998)47 as well as Gleditsch (2012)48, reasonably argue that there is no direct link 
between climate change and violent conflict, instead it is rather an indirect causal relationship 
while other factors are the main causes. Nevertheless, they also agree that natural resource 
scarcity, which is said to be worsened by climate change, can help to generate instability which 
then might lead to cases of violent conflict49. 
Jürgen Scheffran (2012) provides a critical overview of climate change induced security threats 
by presenting potential stress factors that are caused by climate change. He discusses 
environmental change and its impacts on conflict risks before focusing on specific vulnerable 
regions50. Many studies predict dramatic climate change consequences, however, Scheffran 
argues that the causal relationship between climate change and violent conflict is not 
understood sufficiently yet. More significant data and methods are needed. He also concludes 
that a theory based concept is necessary in order to test those complex connections51. 
Moreover, Bruch et al. (2016) focus on recent and comprehensive studies on violent conflict 
in vulnerable societies relating to natural resources and environmental change52. Despite the 
wealth of sources on the connection between climate change and human security, violent 
conflict as well as health, literature is patchy when specifically trying to emphasize significant 
empirical evidence that proves the development of violent conflict due to climate change.  
The case of Darfur has been described as one of, if not the first, so-called ‘climate war’53. This 
thesis discusses whether that term is justified or strikingly oversimplified. A closer look at its 
conflict history and the circumstances shows plausibly that the war in Darfur would have also 
emerged without climate change as an influential factor54. And in reverse, scholars argue that 
climate change impacts alone would have not been enough to cause such escalation55.Thus it 
is arguable to claim that the conflict in Darfur can be understood as a  ‘climate war’. Yet, it 
cannot be denied that climate science has identified the African continent as one of the most 
                                                     
47 Cf. Homer-Dixon, T./Blitt, J. (1998): Ecoviolence: Links among environment, population and security. 
Rowman&Littlefield. Oxford. 
48 Cf. Gleditsch, N. P. (2012): Whither the weather? Climate change and conflict, in: Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol.49, Issue 1, p3-9. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Cf. Scheffran, J. (2012): Globaler Klimawandel und Gewaltkonflikte: Befunde und Perspektiven der Friedens- 
und Konfliktforschung, in: Brzoska, M. et al. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikt. Versicherheitlichung versus 
präventive Friedenspolitik? Nomos. Baden-Baden. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Cf. Bruch, C. et al. (2016): Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Routledge. New 
York. 
53 Cf. Schreiber, W. (2012): Darfur-der erste Klimakrieg?, in: Brzoska, M. et al. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikt. 
Versicherheitlichung versus präventive Friedenspolitik? Nomos. Baden-Baden. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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vulnerable areas to climate change56. Additionally, many African societies suffer from multiple 
conflict causing influences, such as inequality, poverty, and a lack of functioning political and 
legal structures57. In this thesis the focus therefore lies on sub-Saharan Africa and specifically 
on the case of Darfur as it is said to be a proven example of possible future scenarios in Africa.  
 
 
 
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
A review of the literature relating to climate change as well as violent conflict has been 
undertaken. Moreover, case studies and examples of the link between climate change and 
violent conflict have been examined. Relevant research papers and peer reviewed academic 
articles are available online and through publications by suited academic journals and other 
publications. In addition, reports by the IPCC, WHO, UNEP and other United Nations 
Organizations are taken into consideration. A substantial amount of academic analysis and 
empirical research has been done in each of the two separate fields of research. However, there 
is relatively limited empirical interdisciplinary research that explores the relationship between 
climate change and violent including as well as its direct link. A limitation of this thesis is that 
the connection can only be made indirectly. 
 
 
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The thesis is presented in six chapters.  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The introduction sets out the problem statement and research question. It includes an overview 
of the literature to contextualize the research and evidence which reflects the significance of 
the issue. This chapter also sets out the research methodology, including the limitations to the 
                                                     
56 Cf. Basedau, M./ Leidreiter, A. (2012): Der Klimawandel als Ursache von zukünftigen Kriegen im 
subsaharischen Afrika?, in: Brzoska, M. et al. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikt. Versicherheitlichung versus 
präventive Friedenspolitik? Nomos. Baden-Baden. 
57 Ibid.  
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thesis and a chapter outline. Definitions of key terms are also provided, such as climate change 
and violent conflict. 
 
 
Chapter 2: Anthropogenic Climate Change 
The second chapter assesses and contextualizes the research as well as presents the research 
findings with regard to the anthropogenic climate change, such as causes and predicted impacts. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Violent Conflict 
This chapter provides an analysis of violent conflict as well as the causes and influencing 
factors based on the existing literature. This includes, but is not limited to, poverty and low 
incomes, crime, intergroup inequalities as well as demographic factors. Environmental factors 
are only discussed briefly since chapter four examines those risk factors in more detail before 
linking them to the issue of climate change.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Linking Climate Change and Violent Conflict 
This chapter examines the literature on the link between climate change and violent conflict. 
The main focus lies on for the thesis relevant risk factors, such as natural resource dependence 
as well as environmental change and natural resource scarcity. Thus, the connection, yet mostly 
indirect, between climate change and violent conflict is made by showing whether a changing 
climate can be seen as a “threat multiplier” in vulnerable societies. However, the lack of 
sufficient and significant empirical research is also emphasized. 
 
 
Chapter 5: Climate Change and Violent Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa 
Chapter five particularly focuses on sub-Saharan Africa by first presenting findings on the 
impacts of climate change on the continent before examining the available empirical evidence 
on violence caused by climate change in the region; as an example of Darfur is analysed by 
critically presenting the influencing factors as well as necessary background information on 
the infamous conflict. This chapter argues that the case of Darfur cannot be described as a so-
called ‘climate war’ although climate plays an important role. However, reducing the war in 
Darfur to a single cause is misleading and an oversimplified approach.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The final chapter concludes that certain areas and countries are vulnerable in several ways, i.e. 
to climate change and to violent conflict, whereby the combination increases their 
vulnerability. Finally, it is summarised that the consequences of climate change may be seen 
as contribution to the development of violent, however, the link can only be made indirectly. 
Furthermore, it is shown that in cases, where the connection seems to have been proven, other 
causative factors need to be taken into consideration. Such factors include political instability, 
socioeconomic disparities and poverty, high unemployment, authoritarian regimes, violation 
of human rights and other manifestations of social injustice. The case of Darfur delivers proof 
for that. Thus, it is necessary to collect more significant evidence and undertake further studies 
in order to create the necessary framework before providing interventions and policies for a 
possible solution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
When the IPCC published its fourth assessment report in 2007 climate change gained an 
immense amount of public attention58. Since then, the quality of data as well as evidence has 
continued to improve with every report and it can be assured now that there are significant 
climate science data available59. According to the IPCC “[c]limate change […] refers to any 
change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human 
                                                     
58 Cf. Fuchs, A. (2010): Klima und Gesellschaft., in: Voss, M. (eds.): Der Klimawandel. Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Perspektiven. VS Verlg,  Wiesbaden, p47. 
59 Cf. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, p33f. 
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activity”60, therefore it is also referred to as anthropogenic climate change. The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change takes it a step further and defines climate change 
as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters 
the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability 
observed over comparable time periods”61. The following chapter is based on that definition. 
 
2.1. CURRENT OBSERVATIONS 
2.1.1. CHANGES IN CLIMATE 
 
Global warming can be observed through the increase of the temperature in the air and oceans, 
the melting of ice and snow, as well as the rising sea level62. According to the data collected 
between 1906 and 2005 there has been an average temperature increase of 0.74° C63. In its 
Synthesis Report Climate Change 2014, IPCC stated that the average surface temperature of 
our planet has already increased by 0.85°C in the last century, which is again an increase since 
the report in200764. This development has been the trend for the last two decades while the last 
ten years have, according to the latest report, provided the warmest temperatures since the start 
of temperature recordings65. In parts, there are obvious regional developments that differ from 
the global trend: on the one hand, the temperature increase in the northern hemisphere is more 
radical, i.e. the temperature in the arctic region is in fact twice as high as the global trend, while 
on the other hand, continents heat up faster and more intensely than the ocean66.  
Although it is arguable to blame single extreme weather events on climate change in general, 
it can be said with 80% certainty that particular events, such as the heat wave in Russia in 2010 
as well as the drought in the US in 2012 which affected nearly 60% of the country, can be 
traced back to climate change67. In addition, scientists could prove with 90% certainty that the 
                                                     
60 Ibid. 
61 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), Article 1. 
62 Cf. Reusswig, F. (2010): Klimawandel und Gesellschaft. Vom Katastrophen- zum Gestaltungsdiskurs im 
Horizont der postkarbonen Gesellschaft., in: Voss, M. (eds.): Der Klimawandel. Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Perspektiven. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, p47. 
63 Cf. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, p34. 
64 ibid., p4. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid.; p35. 
67 Cf. Harmeling, S. (2011): Global Climate Risk Index 2012. Who suffers most from extreme weather events? 
Weather related loss events in 2010 and 1991 to 2010. Germanwatch, Bonn, p7. 
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time period between 1950 and 2000 has been the warmest in at least 500 years for the Northern 
hemisphere68.  
Moreover, precipitation patterns have changed due to global warming. Those changes differ 
regionally, as well. Since a warmer atmosphere can absorb more water, the risk of more intense 
precipitation as well as longer dry periods increase69. Between 1900 and 2005 more and 
stronger rainfall could be observed in North and South America, central Asia, and Northern 
Europe; whereas there had been a decrease of precipitation in Southern Africa, the Sahel zone, 
the Mediterranean, and parts of Southern Asia70.  
 
 
2.1.2. IMPACTS 
 
The above presented climatic changes have already caused severe and diverse impacts. In the 
last century sea level has in total risen by 15 to 20cm; and the pace at which this happens only 
increases. This can be traced back to the thermic expansion of water as well as the increase of 
additional meltwater while it has been the highest increase in the last thousand years71.  
Since 1978 available satellite data have proven the decrease of ice and snow coverage in many 
areas. There has been 2.7% less ice per decade in the arctic, Greenland, as well as the Antarctic. 
Seasonal frost in the Northern hemisphere as well as the arctic permafrost has melted rapidly 
and had a negative impact on indigenous peoples72. 
The observed changes in the climate have already led to more extreme weather events, such as 
more intense tropical storms due to higher temperatures of the atmosphere and ocean, severe 
floods caused by heavy rainfall and sea level rise, and more extreme heat waves. At the same 
time, poorer countries are more vulnerable to those changes as the Climate Risk Index shows73. 
                                                     
68 Cf. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, p35. 
69 Cf. CNA (2007): National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. The CAN Corporation, Alexandria, p56. 
70 Cf. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, p35. 
71 Cf. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, p35. 
72 Cf. Fuchs, A. (2010): Klima und Gesellschaft., in Voss, M. (eds.): Der Klimawandel. Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Perspektiven. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, p41. 
73 Cf. Harmeling, S. (2011): Global Climate Risk Index 2012. Who suffers most from extreme weather events? 
Weather related loss events in 2010 and 1991 to 2010. Germanwatch, Bonn, p6. 
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However, even in countries with better adaptation mechanisms extreme weather events can 
have severely negative effects, including impacts on human health. An estimated number of 
55.000 people died in summer 2010 due to the heat wave in Russia. In 2003 the European heat 
wave caused the death of approximately 30.000 to 50.000 people74. Infamous storm ‘Katrina’ 
is also said to be a consequence of climate change75. 
The IPCC estimates that up to 250 million people on the African continent alone will be 
affected by floods until the year 2050, depending on the previous grade of destruction due to 
climate change76. Such destructions refer to access to water, food security and locally produced 
goods. Although studies do not offer coherent estimations, it can be expected, that Africa, even 
if we choose to trust the more convenient projected outcomes, is characterised by its 
vulnerability. Especially, the sahelzone, the coastal areas in Eastern Africa, landscapes with 
big lakes as well as dry landscapes are vulnerable for damage and destruction due to relatively 
low economic strength and low capability of adaption77. One of the visible effects are, for 
example, migration from rural areas causing urbanisation and social problems in major cities. 
Cities that are located close to river mouths present another problem. If, for example, the sea 
level rise increases by one meter in Gambia, its capital city, Banjul, will literally be 
submerged78. 
Nomadic shepherds in Eastern Africa belong to the groups that are most at risk. Pastoral 
farming has always suffered under difficult circumstances: little rain and little vegetation. Thus 
the natural environment as well as its habitants have adapted to the dry climate. Here 
adjustments to the lack of water are essential for the survival. When a drought damages a clan, 
neighbours help by lending livestock for breeding purposes79. There are approximately 50 
million members of nomadic shepherd clans in the sub-Saharan region who are witnessing the 
change of rainfall intensity as well as frequency which also affects the vegetation. Extreme 
changes in the weather lead to a decreasing amount of pasture grounds and waterholes80. 
Furthermore, impacts on biological and physical systems can be observed due to the changes 
in temperature. Several glacial lakes have grown while other waters suffer from negative 
                                                     
74 Cf. German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) (2007): Climate Change as a Security Risk. Earthscan, 
London, p60. 
75 Cf. CNA (2007): National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. The CAN Corporation, Alexandria, p58. 
76 cf. Rathgeber, T. (2009): Klimawandel verletzt Menschenrechte. Über die Voraussetzungen einer gerechten Klimapolitik, 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, p.25. 
77 ibid., p.26f. 
78 ibid., p.26. 
79 ibid., p.28. 
80 ibid., p.26.  
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impacts on their water quality. Additionally, biological processes in flora and fauna have 
shifted seasonally and geographically81. 
 
 
2.2. CAUSES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The current average temperature of the planet is +15° C. The reason for that is the so-called 
‘greenhouse-effect’, which on the hand is absolutely natural and necessary as the average 
temperature would otherwise be -18° C82. The mentioned effect is caused by the so-called 
‘greenhouse gas’ in the atmosphere which is light-permeable for sunrays while impermeable 
for the long-wave heat rays coming from the planet; this causes a temperature increase of the 
atmosphere83. The most important greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), halogenated hydrocarbons, and water vapour which all differ with 
regards to their characteristics and durability84.  
However, the connection between emissions and greenhouse gas is not linear but dynamic since 
the marine and terrestrial biosphere, specifically in the form of oceans and forests, absorbs 
carbon dioxide as part of the carbon cycle85. On top of that, so-called aerosols, which are 
mixtures of solid and liquid suspended particles and gas, such as organic carbon dioxide, 
carbon black, sulphate, dust, and nitrate, have a cooling effect and thus an impact on 
precipitation86. This natural greenhouse effect has been intensified since the industrial 
revolution and its accompanied greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Between 1970 and 2004 
alone, the human induced greenhouse gas emissions had increased by 70%87. This has also 
                                                     
81 Cf. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, p37. 
82 Cf. Rahmstorf, S. (2009): Die globale Erwärmung., in: S. Böhler et al. (eds.): Jahrhundertproblem Klimawandel. 
Forschungsstand, Perspektiven, Lösungswege. Wochenschau Verlag, Schwalbach, p19. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Cf. Reusswig, F. (2010): Klimawandel und Gesellschaft. Vom Katastrophen- zum Gestaltungsdiskurs 
im Horizont der postkarbonen Gesellschaft., in: Voss, M. (eds.): Der Klimawandel. Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Perspektiven. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, p78. 
86 Cf. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, p40. 
87 Ibid. 
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been the trend in the recent past. While the annual growth rate between 1990 and 2000 was 
only 1%, it had increased to an average of already 3.4% between 2000 and 201088.  
Moreover, science has determined that the global atmospheric concentration of human induced 
greenhouse gas has exceeded the natural amount of the last 650,000 years by far89. This 
increase could be traced back to activities related to the generation of energy, the industrial as 
well as agricultural sector, and transportation90. With approximately 77%, CO2 is the largest 
component of all anthropogenic, i.e. human induced, greenhouse gases91. As stated in 2009, its 
concentration in the atmosphere has increased by 38% since the beginning of industrialization. 
Most of the emissions come from using fossil fuels as well as changes in land use, such as 
deforestation. The increase of methane emissions by 152%, on the other hand, can primarily 
be traced back to the agricultural sector which is also responsible for the increase of nitrous 
oxide by 19%92. Compared to greenhouse gases, solar activity, with its 5%, has relatively little 
impact93. 
Taking those data into account while also considering the consequences of such greenhouse 
gas emissions, the global warming of the last five decades can only be explained with models 
that include human influence. Thus scientists conclude that, with high probability, manmade 
emissions outweigh the natural changes of the complex ecological system of the planet and 
therefore need to be taken into consideration when analysing climate change94. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
88 Cf. Reusswig, F. (2011): Klimawandel und globale Umweltveränderungen., in: Groß, M. (eds.): Handbuch 
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Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
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2.3. FUTURE PROJECTIONS 
2.3.1. EMISSIONS  
 
Based on different socio-economic, demographic, and technological assumptions it can be 
predicted how future emissions are connected to changes in climate. These predictions are 
supported by the fact that all projections from the first IPCC report for the time period between 
1990 and 2005 were met95.  
However, there is still some uncertainty with regards to those predictions due to natural climate 
variability, clouding, aerosols, and so-called feedback processes96. 
Such feedback processes can intensify global warming and can be seen in the form of the 
reflection of melting snow and ice, methane leaks due to melting permafrost, and decreasing 
ability of the ocean as well as biosphere to absorb carbon dioxide97. 
Nonetheless, a few general outcomes, relating to changing wind-, temperature-, and 
precipitation patterns, can be projected, regardless of the intensity of climate change or 
different future scenarios. According to those projections, the temperature will increase the 
most in the far Northern parts of the planet, albeit the Amazonas region as well as parts of 
China will experience drastic warming. There will be more rain in the Northern hemisphere 
whereas it can be assumed that precipitation will decrease in the Amazonas region, Southern 
Africa, South East Asia, the Mediterranean, as well as Eastern Australia.   
Yet, that does not mean that it will rain in the area the evaporation took place. Globally, 
however, an increase of rainfall can be expected. Thus, it can be said that there are regional 
differences regarding the repercussions of climate change98. 
Additionally, predictions, specifically from the middle of the 21st century onwards, differ since 
the climatic system reacts very slowly and delayed to those changes99. Though, it can be 
expected that, compared to the time period between 1981 and 1999,  there will be a temperature 
increase up to 1.7°C by the year 2040100. 
                                                     
95 Cf. Rahmstorf, S. (2009): Die globale Erwärmung., in: S. Böhler et al. (eds.): Jahrhundertproblem Klimawandel. 
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Given the current counter measures, global emissions will increase by another 25% to 90%, 
depending on the predicted future scenario101. Such an increase would lead to further warming 
and thus to far more drastic impacts than seen in the 20th century102. In order to minimize those 
impacts the concentration of greenhouse gases needs to be stabilized which requires a reduction 
of emissions103. 
Consequently, referring to the maximum emissions in 2015 for example, emissions should be 
cut by 50 to 80% by the year 2050104. This is only possible if humankind reacts accordingly in 
the next two decades resulting in the prevention of further negative climate change impacts105. 
The concept of  climate sensitivity serves as a crucial predictive value to determine the effect 
of an increasing carbon dioxide concentration on temperature increase. If doubling the carbon 
dioxide concentration it can be expected that the average warming will increase by up to 
4.5°C106. Based on the those projections the IPCC predicts, in an ‘optimistic‘ scenario, a 
warming between 1.1°C and 2.9°C for the time period between 2090 and 2099, using the time 
period between 1980 and 1999 as a reference. The worst case scenario on the other hand, would 
be a temperature increase of 2.4°C to 6.4°C107. According to the IPCC such ‘pessimistic’ 
projections are based to fairly realistic assumptions as greenhouse gas emissions in the 21st 
century are even higher than in the theoretical worst case as stated in the third IPCC assessment 
report of 2001108. In order to comprehend the extent of a warming of over 4°C it is worth 
looking at the last ice age when the average temperature was between 4°C and 6°C below the 
average temperature today109. Yet, even if all parties abide by the recommendations and climate 
protection measures, made at several the United Nations climate conferences and agreements 
such as the infamous Paris Agreement in 2015 where it states that the aim is to hold “the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and 
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pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”110, it can 
still be expected that there will be a temperature increase of over 3°C by 2100111. 
Thus, the majority of experts agree that the global warming must not exceed an increase of 
2°C112 so that a “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”113 can be 
prevented. However, this is the first time in at least 100,000 years that mankind has to deal 
with such a change of climate and consecutively needs to reduce emissions by 80% before 
2050 if the target of 2°C should be met114. 
 
 
2.3.1. CONSEQUENCES   
 
The knowledge and research on certain important effects due to sea level rise is still limited, 
albeit growing. Thus, relevant future models focus more on the thermic expansion of the ocean 
than melting continental mass. However, the melting of those ice caps have a high risk potential 
which may lead to worse consequences than expected115. 
It is important to bear in mind that “[c]limate models are representations of the climate system 
based on fundamental physical laws and observations. The climate system is, however, highly 
complex and there are known uncertainties associated with climate predictions, for example on 
the future level of GHG emissions; [..] to account for these uncertainties climate scientists 
present future projections as probabilistic assessments of climate change effects and impacts, 
covering a range of plausible different future scenarios”116. According to the United Kingdom 
Government Office of Science, “the climate system is slow to respond”117, especially with 
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regards to sea levels which “will continue to rise for far longer”118 even if greenhouse gas 
emissions are stabilized119.  
Schaeffer et al. developed a semi-empirical climate model which predicts sea level rise for 
different future scenarios depending on emissions and temperature. They have established that, 
even if mitigation targets were met, sea level will rise by 96cm between 2000 and 2100120. If 
the average temperature increase does not exceed 3°C, which requires even stronger mitigation 
efforts, there will be a sea level rise of approximately 355cm by the year 2300 while projections 
go up to 500cm121. Provided that all emissions were reduced by 2016 sea level would have 
risen from 59cm in 2100 to 131cm in 2300122. It is needless to say that such utopian scenario 
is not realistic anymore; and probably never was. 
Scenarios of drastic sea level rise present challenges to both ecosystems and socioeconomic 
systems which might result in floods in coastal areas as well as on islands123. A sea level rise 
of only 100cm implies that 20% of Bangladesh would end up under water124. Furthermore, the 
danger of non-linear events and processes, such as the melting of Greenland’s ice sheets, is 
accompanied by even more uncertainty. Some studies predict that a temperature increase of 
‘only’ 3°C might already be accompanied by the radical melting of those ice sheet masses 
which would then result in an additional sea level rise of 700cm over the next few centuries125. 
According to the IPCC, “[l]arge-scale ocean circulation changes beyond the 21st century 
cannot be reliably assessed because of uncertainties in the meltwater supply from the Greenland 
ice sheet and model response to the warming”126, however, scientists argue that “[a]n increase 
in glacial melt will, in the short term, initially increase river flow, which may bring greater risk 
of flooding. In the longer term it is likely that there will be an eventual decline in runoff, which 
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may lead to water scarcity in those regions dependent upon glacier-fed rivers, although the 
potential timescale for this decline is uncertain”127.   
Temperature and precipitation patterns also have an influence on freshwater which means that 
available freshwater and groundwater in coastal regions might suffer from salinization128. Due 
to stronger evaporation processes, however, it can be assumed that the availability of freshwater 
will decrease even in regions with high precipitation129.  
After all, current projections are still too uncertain and differ regionally which makes it difficult 
to plan and implement potential future water management projects130. Moreover, an increase 
of water temperature as well as excessive rainfall may result in poor water quality in many 
regions131. Even regions which are projected to receive less rainfall might experience strong 
rain due to higher climate variability. At the same time the overall trend may be going towards 
longer phases of drought132. 
Although there has been a substantial amount of climate research, studies and specifically 
future climate models show that there is still strong uncertainty about future predictions. 
However, experts from all disciplines argue that climate change will have severe implications 
for societies as well economies including water availability, food security, and health133.  
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: VIOLENT CONFLICT 
3.1. DEFINING VIOLENT CONFLICT 
 
Conflicts per se are inevitable and a necessary by-product of social change, however, it is a 
question of how they are handled and resolved134. In order to examine the connection between 
climate change and violent conflict the latter also needs to be clarified. When speaking of 
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violent conflict in this thesis it is referred to political violent conflict which the WHO defines 
as a form of collective violence135. 
According to Tilly (2003), collective violence can be defined as “episodic social interaction 
that: immediately inflicts physical damage on persons and/or objects (‘damage’ includes 
forcible seizure of persons or objects over restraint or resistance); involves at least two 
perpetrators; and results at least in part from coordination among persons who perform the 
damaging acts”136. Developing this definition further, the WHO understands collective 
violence as “the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members 
of a group – whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity – against another 
group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives”137. 
Violent conflicts can take on various forms such as “[w]ars, terrorism and other violent political 
conflicts that occur within or between states”138 as well as “[s]tate-perpetrated violence such 
as genocide, repression, disappearances, torture and other abuses of human rights”139 and 
“[o]rganized violent crime such as banditry and gang warfare”140. There are several definitions 
of violent conflict. Many of which are controversial. The HIIK suggests the following definition 
for political conflict first in order to determine violent political conflict: 
“[A] political conflict is a perceived incompatibility of intentions between individuals or social 
groups. Such an incompatibility emerges from the presence of actors who communicate and 
act with regard to certain objects. These actions and communications are known as measures, 
while the objects form the issues of positional differences. Actors, measures, and issues are the 
constitutive attributes of political conflict”141. The institute further analyses the concept of 
intensity and distinguishes between non-violent and violent conflict. It also identifies different 
levels of violent conflict, such as violent crisis, limited war, and war142. According to the HIIK, 
“[a] political conflict is classified as a violent crisis when at least one actor uses 
force sporadically against persons – or things in case that physical violence against people is 
considered acceptable. The applied means and consequences altogether are limited”143, 
whereas “[a] political conflict is classified as a limited war when at least one actor uses force 
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against persons and maybe things in a distinctive way. The applied means and consequences 
altogether are serious”144, and finally “[a] political conflict is classified as a war when at least 
one actor uses force massively against persons and maybe things. The applied means and 
consequences altogether need to be framed as extensive”145. 
In this thesis the term violent conflict refers to all types of political violent conflict as a form of 
collective violence as defined above. In the case of Darfur the type of violent conflict can be 
classified as the worst type and thus falls under the description war, i.e. armed conflict, or even 
genocide146, which will be relevant in chapter five.  
The common and historical understanding of war is violence between states, however, its 
definition is controversial. In order to determine whether a conflict can be described as war or 
not certain questions need to be answered. Such questions include the amount of deaths the 
fighting has caused, the period of time in which it has taken place, geographical boundaries, 
and hostilities147.   
International instruments thus rather use the term armed conflict in order to minimize confusion 
and controversies and “prevent loopholes in the applicability of humanitarian law”148. 
Nonetheless, there is still a variety of armed conflicts, such as so-called new wars or 
asymmetric wars, which indicate that there are new types of conflicts that exceed the traditional 
understanding of armed conflict and involve large-scale human rights violations149.  
As mentioned above the conflict in Darfur is also referred to as genocide which, according to 
the WHO, is “a particularly heinous form of collective violence, especially since perpetrators 
of genocide intentionally target a population group with the aim of destroying it. Genocide thus 
has, by definition, a collective dimension”150. The term was only legally defined after the 
Second World War, nonetheless, it has been used to identify conflicts as genocide that had 
taken place before the Second World War. The horror of the holocaust started the international 
debate and led to the official definition of genocide in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948 which came into force in 1951. In Article 2 if 
the Convention genocide is determined as “any of the following acts committed with intent to 
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destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing 
members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”151.  
 
 
3.2. CAUSES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT 
 
The outbreak of violent conflict is not limited to one single cause but is often based on a 
combination of factors. There are multiple reasons for violent conflict which do not occur 
isolated from other influences152.  
In the following, the different causes for violent conflict will be examined briefly. According 
to the GSDRC, those causes can be divided into political and institutional factors, identity 
politics, socioeconomic factors, and resource and environmental factors which include climate 
change, environmental insecurity and resource scarcity153. Natural resources and 
environmental factors, however, are discussed in detail in chapter four as it is the focus of this 
dissertation.  
 
 
3.2.1. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
 
Weak state institutions are seen as one of the reasons for violent conflict as societies can be 
fractured if political institutions are not able to manage different group interests peacefully, 
protect certain groups, or provide opportunities for political participation154. There is a degree 
of consensus among social scientists that there is a connection between levels of democracy 
and the probability of violent conflict in a society155. Stable democracies are able to cope with 
tensions peacefully whereas authoritarian regimes tend to manage conflict through force and 
violence.  
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Mainsfield and Synder (2007) also claim that mature democracies lead to a more peaceful 
world, however, it is questionable whether that is the case during the democratization 
process156. In the transitional phase on the way to democracy states in fact tend to become more 
aggressive. The conditions need to be ripe to promote democracy, i.e. democratic institutions 
have to be in place as well as electoral politics have to be introduced in order to reduce the risk 
of violence157. 
State weakness, which can result in collective fear and uncertainty regarding the future158 and 
indiscriminate repression can lead to “the emergence of armed responses by marginalised 
groups and nationalist, ethnic or other populist ideologies”159. Thus states are most vulnerable 
when going through a transitional phase from autocracy to democracy160. 
Another issue with regards to political and institutional factors are elite power struggles and 
political exclusion stemming from the legacies of colonialism and liberation struggles in 
Africa, Asia, South America, and the Middle East, while Sub-Saharan Africa is the most 
conflict-intensive region in the world161. Such legacies include fights over power and land as 
well as divisive and militarized politics162. In some countries post-liberation leaders have 
sustained these structures and dynamics, “retaining power through neopatrimonial networks, 
state capture, militarisation and coercion”163. According to relevant studies, those leaders have 
used and maintained ideologies promoting the above mentioned ‘us versus them’ concept in 
order to exclude and marginalize certain groups. Moreover, preventing groups from access to 
state structures while giving privileges to individual leaders, political parties or specific groups 
leads to the exacerbation of social division and exclusion. This may provide opportunities to 
excluded leaders to mobilize groups for protests and possibly engage in violence. On the other 
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hand, “inclusive elite bargains that seek to address social fragmentation and integrate a broad 
coalition of key elites can reduce the chances of violent rebellion”164. 
Additionally, corruption and the breakdown in social contract, which is a political theoretical 
“framework of rules that governs state-society relations and the distribution of resources, rights 
and responsibilities in an organised society”165, may also lead to violent conflict. According to 
Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009) violent conflict, in fact, requires the failure of social contract 
or institutional breakdown166.  
It is crucial for a government to spend public revenue, coming from taxes or natural resources, 
fairly and consider the people’s needs. Conflict is less probable if revenue is spent appropriately 
on the satisfaction of basic needs and social welfare opposed to corrupt and fractional purposes 
as corruption undermines public trust in government, increases socioeconomic grievances, 
deters domestic and foreign investment, and worsens in economic inequalities. It is equally 
important for the state to provide basic services, such as justice and security, to all citizens in 
order to strengthen state legitimacy and trust in its institutions. Some cases show that ruling 
parties can resort to violence to stabilize their rule and thus sustain opportunities for corruption 
which may lead to violent outbreaks by marginalized groups167. 
 
 
3.2.2. IDENTITY POLITICS 
 
Group-identity theories “aim to explain the way groups reinforce their identities and the ‘we-
they’ cleavages that often result”168. Those theories are based on social psychological theories 
and include intergroup conflicts that involve nationalism, ethnicity, and religion169. It can also 
result from a sense of and need for “camaraderie or ‘we-ness’ that can be satisfied in a group 
when it discriminates against or attacks another group”170. 
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The so-called group entitlement theory171 puts more emphasis on ethnic factors. These factors, 
however, accompany economic and political factors172. Ethnic diversity in isolation does seem 
to be a cause of violent conflict. This would mean that the most war-prone states are the most 
ethnically diverse, which is not correct173. Instead, it could even be that ethnic and religious 
diversity which reduces the risk of violent conflict174, “perhaps because it encourages divergent 
groups to learn the skills of living together despite diversity. When this learning process fails, 
however, ethnic diversity may turn out to exacerbate conflict and increase the likelihood of 
serious escalation, precisely because it offers fertile material for political mobilisation”175. 
It is debatable what role exactly identity politics plays in regarding violent conflict. The so-
called ‘primordialist’ argument claims that “ethnic, religious or cultural differences inevitably 
result in conflict”176, however, it has been discredited in much of the literature. So-called 
‘intsrumentalists’, on the other hand, argue that identity is a construct and used as means of 
mobilization177. 
Contemporary scholars attempt to find a balance between the two extremes by arguing that 
identities and differences based on ethnicity, religion, and culture are not the main causes for 
conflict, though, if exploited they “provide a system of beliefs and practices that can unite 
adherents in a community, alter their perception of others and encourage them to take collective 
action in the name of their group”178. 
Especially, when facing discrimination and exclusion, group identity can become an issue and 
a crucial factor which may cause groups to resort to violence. That, however, depends on the 
cohesion within ethnic, religious, and cultural groups. It is believed that weak cohesion within 
groups reduces the likelihood of such violent mobilization179. 
According to Lake and Rothchild three key factors have to take hold in order to contribute to 
ethnic violent conflict. Firstly, information failure, i.e. groups or individuals misrepresent or 
misinterpret information about other groups; secondly, issues of credible commitment take 
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place, i.e. groups cannot credibly and reliably assure that they will not break or exploit a mutual 
agreement; and lastly, security dilemmas, which means that one or more parties in dispute are 
willing to use pre-emptive force180. To support the argument that ethnic diversity alone does 
not cause conflict, Cocodia (2008) confirms that fairness, justice, external threats, as well as 
the level of education, determine the probability of violent conflict181. 
Both, dominant as well as marginalized group leaders use identity politics to mobilize their 
groups in order to articulate discontent and exclusion. Nonetheless, this does not mean that all 
politics referring to ethnicity or religion promote exclusion or violence. Although identity can 
contribute to issues of power as well as of grievance, it can also be used peacefully in order to 
promote inclusion and empowerment through the claiming of rights and citizenship182.  
 
 
3.2.3. SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
Homer-Dixon suggests “that people become aggressive when they feel frustrated by something 
or someone they believe is blocking them from fulfilling a strong desire”183. Such claims are 
based on “psychological theories of individual behaviour to explain civil strife, including 
revolutions, insurgencies, strikes, riots and coups”184. The resulting frustration and aggression 
can be caused by so-called relative deprivation185. Smith states that “[r]elative deprivation 
theory offers an explanation that is based on the contrast between groups’ expected and actual 
access to prosperity and power”186.  In other words, it is relative as it “arises when people 
perceive a widening gap between the level of satisfaction they have achieved (often defined in 
economic terms) and the level they believe they deserve”187. It is thus a subjective perception 
and depends on the individuals standards of justice and fairness188.   
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There is a certain degree of consensus in the literature that inequality per se, rather than the 
extent of inequality, determines the probability of violent conflict. Research has shown that 
horizontal inequalities, i.e. inequalities related to ethnic, religious or cultural identities, are 
more likely to result in violence189. Specifically, multidimensional horizontal inequalities, may 
cause conflict by excluding culturally defined groups from multiple spheres, such as justice, 
security, economic, social, and political domains190. 
It is not rare that different forms of inequalities, exclusion and marginalization interact and 
exacerbate each other. Accordingly, unequal access to power and decision-making processes 
can lead to unequal access to natural resources and land, for instance. Exclusion based on social 
identity, may it be perceived or actual, can result in a strong feeling of collective injustice and 
increase a group’s sense of alienation from the majority of society and therefore cause 
frustration and resentment. Over time, such tensions can foster group mobilisation and fuel 
violent conflict191. However, such relative deprivation does not only affect excluded and 
marginalized groups but also the privileged who fear losing their status quo. One of the critical 
factors which decides whether discontent and resentment turns into violence is the 
government’s response. The states responsibility is then to address exclusion instead of reacting 
unreasonably to a peaceful protest, for example, in order to prevent violent outbreaks192. 
The best way to do so, according to Cederman et al., is to involve and include former 
marginalized groups and giving them a real stake in their state’s future193. Inequality and 
exclusion as a conflict cause may go hand in hand with the failing of the social contract as 
mentioned above194. 
Within the socioeconomic factors poverty is a major component, i.e. there is an obvious and 
clear connection between poverty and violent conflict. Studies show that a substantial amount 
of conflicts take place in poor countries, however, it is debatable what the direction of causality 
is. There is evidence that conflict exacerbates poverty; yet most scholars claim that poverty per 
se is rarely a direct cause of conflict. Instead it is mainly relative deprivation that increases the 
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probability of violent conflict. On the other hand, poverty can certainly contribute or maintain 
conflict due to its link to the perception of injustices, exclusion, as well as marginalization195. 
Smith (2004) summarizes it as follows: “Poor economic conditions are the most important 
long-term causes of intra-state armed conflicts today; Repressive political systems are also war-
prone, especially in periods of transition; Degradation of renewable resources (specifically soil 
erosion, deforestation and water scarcity) can also contribute significantly to the likelihood of 
violent conflict, but are in general not as central to the problem as political and economic 
determinants; Ethnic diversity alone is not a cause of armed conflict, but parties to a conflict 
are often defined by their ethnic identities”196.  
Since this dissertation focuses on the link between climate change and violent conflict the 
causes regarding natural resources and environmental factors are examined in the following 
chapter in order to draw the connection between the two fields. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: LINKING CLIMATE CHANGE AND VIOLENT CONFLICT 
4.1. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND VIOLENT CONFLICT 
 
The debate on the link between climate change and violent conflict can be understood as a 
continuation of the environmental security debate which includes the issue of violent conflict 
in the context of environmental change197. Thus, the following section gives a brief overview 
of the current relevant findings with regards to environmental conflict. 
The possibly most important outcome that has been concluded from existing research is that 
environmental degradation is generally seen as only one of the contributing factors in a 
combination of multiple causes of violent conflict. Environmental degradation in itself does 
not directly result in violence. The deciding factors are primarily of political, social, and 
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economic nature, as mentioned in the previous chapter. However, these causes may be 
influenced or exacerbated by environmental changes198. 
Many scholars, such as Brzoska (2008), point out that it is first and foremost the scarcity of 
renewable natural resources that plays a role regarding conflict relevant environmental 
changes. The competition over water, food, as well as land in combination with the already 
existing probability and risk of conflict may therefore intensify such risks and lead to the 
outbreak of violent conflict199. The scarcity or lack of natural resources can, for example, result 
in institutional weakness as well social and economic issues which can produce the necessary 
conditions for conflict200. At the same time, social grievances, as a cause of conflict, can lead 
to unequal access to scarce resources201. 
The unequal distribution of renewable resources, as well as the decrease of quality and quantity 
of such, may in addition cause migration. However, political, social, and cultural aspects need 
to be considered, too. Migration, due to environmental change, may then act as a threat 
multiplier to existing conflicts in the destination region. Consequently, problems caused by 
contradicting political identities, may be worsened. Additionally, further environmental 
damage, as well as poverty, can in turn lead to stronger competition over scarce resources202. 
A state’s problem solving skills turn out to be a crucial aspect in the case of violent conflict as 
a consequence of increasing environmental degradation. Whether conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully is determined by the strength or weakness of state institutions which is why 
developing countries as well as states in transition phases with weak state institutions are 
specifically vulnerable and conflict prone to increasing environmental stress203.  
Furthermore, strong state institutions are able to provide peaceful allocation mechanisms to 
regulate competition of natural resources.If such mechanisms fail and certain groups feel 
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deprived there is a risk for escalating conflicts204. Moreover, the legitimacy and governance of 
a state may be further weakened through environmental degradation and ecological damage 
and thus result in weak societal resilience205. Environmental conflict studies also find that the 
likelihood of violent conflict between states, due to environmental change, decreases. Instead, 
there is a relatively high probability of local and scattered low intensity conflicts between 
groups and communities206. It is therefore suggested that there is no direct causal relationship 
between environmental change, resource scarcity and violent conflict. Nevertheless, it has also 
been established that that there are complex interdependencies and amplifying components that 
can, in combination with political and socioeconomic factors, lead to the destabilization of 
states and societies which are then vulnerable to violent conflict207 
However, due to primarily qualitative studies of observable violent conflicts over soil 
degradation, legal land and water issues, as well as environmentally induced migration in the 
past, it has been shown that there is a strong need for further research in order to comprehend 
the linkages to a better extent208. Due to contradicting quantitative empirical evidence, as well 
several analytical problems, scholars cannot conclude that there is no correlation between 
environmental change and violent conflict at all. Thus research needs to take into account that 
environmental problems can be an indirect conflict cause and therefore exacerbate direct 
reasons for violent conflict. Furthermore, it should not be ignored that environmental 
conditions cannot only be examined nationally but also regionally. It is also suggested to 
include violent conflicts of low intensity as well as conflicts without the participation of the 
state in future studies209. 
 
 
 
                                                     
204 Cf. . Breitmeier, H. (2009): Klimawandel und Gewaltkonflikte. Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, 
Osnabrück, p14. 
205 Cf. Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1999): Environment, Scarcity and Violence. Princeton University Press. Princeton, p65.; 
Scheffran, J. (2011): Globaler Klimawandel und Gewaltkonflikte: Befunde und Perspektiven der Friedens- und 
Konfliktforschung; in: Brzoska, M. et al. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikte. Versicherheitlichung versus 
präventive Friedenspolitik?, Nomos. Baden-Baden, p33. 
206 Ibid.; WBGU (2007): Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel. Springer. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York. 
207 Cf. Breitmeier, H. (2009): Klimawandel und Gewaltkonflikte. Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, 
Osnabrück, p13. 
208 Cf. Scheffran, J. (2011): Globaler Klimawandel und Gewaltkonflikte: Befunde und Perspektiven der Friedens- 
und Konfliktforschung; in: Brzoska, M. et al. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikte. Versicherheitlichung versus 
präventive Friedenspolitik?, Nomos. Baden-Baden, p37. 
209 Cf. Bernauer, T. (2012): Environmental changes and violent conflict. Environmental Research Letters, 7(1), 
p3. 
38 
 
4.2. ‘CLIMATE CHANGE INDUCED’ CONFLICT CONSTELLATIONS 
 
The empirically found connections between environmental change and violent conflict are 
often relatively small, yet the expected repercussions of climate change may result in that such 
connections become more significant. Currently, climate related relationships are still based on 
uncertainty as it is not useful to refer to historically empirical analysis210. The reason for that 
is that climate change, according to Scheffran (2011), is mainly a problem of the future whereas 
there are only data on the past available. Thus the people’s and societies’ reaction can also not 
be deducted from historically unique changes in the environment or climate211. 
At the same time the debate on security and peace is fairly new in the climate change context. 
Thus the process of linking those fields and projection societal risks as a consequence of 
climate change is only in its early stages. It is important to not jump to conclusions but rather 
interpret information carefully and not to, despite the limited data, negate or deny a link 
between climate change and violent conflict212. 
This chapter identifies potential conflict risks due to climate change and illustrates conflict 
promoting mechanisms. On the other hand, extreme and irreversible consequences of climate 
change and its  tipping point are not taken into consideration since it is too uncertain whether 
those scenarios will actually occur213. Following the findings of environmental conflict studies 
there is a certain degree of consensus that climate change can be seen as a threat-multiplier 
which, whilst on its own is not a sufficient cause of violent conflict, is found in a complex 
combination with other factors214. 
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How severe climate and conflict risks are strongly depend on the intensity of climate change 
and thus the mitigation efforts215. In addition, the vulnerability to climate change as well as 
conflict plays a crucial role, i.e. how strongly affected a region is by climate change. Moreover, 
a society’s stability as well as the ability to adapt to climate change are decisive in order to 
prevent conflict216. 
At the same time adaptation pressures and other challenges due to climate change impacts can 
weaken states and make them more vulnerable217. Along with the amplifying effect of existing 
conflict risks water scarcity, conflicts over land, food insecurity, extreme weather events, and 
climate induced migration can be expected to fuel potential conflict constellations. Climate 
change can lead to natural resource scarcity which can result in poverty and social tensions and 
thus increases conflict risks218. 
 
 
4.2.1. CLIMATE AND CONFLICT VULNERABILITY   
 
As previously mentioned, the ability to adapt as well as problem solving skills are crucial for 
affected societies when it comes to dealing with climate change impacts and their resulting 
challenges in order to prevent violent conflict. In this context adaption can be understood as 
the capacity to respond to climate induced changes and challenges, as well as to resolve conflict 
effectively and peacefully219. A society’s vulnerability as well as adaptive capacity are 
therefore determined by civil society, institutional and economic factors, such as access to 
resources, education, information, as well as the stability and effectiveness of state 
institutions220.  
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Furthermore, relevant problem solving skills are negatively influenced by a fragile state with a 
lack of governance capacities which is why necessary adaptation mechanisms as well as 
peaceful conflict resolution specifically fails in unstable and less developed countries221. In 
contrast, stable states can handle such challenges better and continue to function under those 
circumstances. Whereas weak states are characterized by deficiencies when it comes to the 
state’s monopoly on legitimate use of force, the rule of law, or the welfare system including 
the provision of public goods222. Thus bad governance can increase social tensions while the 
social system of developed countries can absorb insecurities much better223.  
Particularly developing countries struggle with state failure and destabilizing processes since 
they are overwhelmed with both climate change impacts and conflict risks; additionally, they 
lack necessary adaptations measures224. According to the Fragile States Index (2017) there 
were 35 countries ranked with alert, high alert, and very high alert in 2017 whereby the 
majority of these countries can be found on the African continent225. Climate change affects 
already fragile states severely. The insufficient ability to protect its people from climate change 
impacts puts extra pressure on those countries which may then lead to further destabilization 
and failure of the state226). That way circumstances in certain states can be worsened 
undermining the legitimacy and stability of the government even further. 
Consequently, the risk that existing conflicts may escalate increases which can cause a dynamic 
in which climate change impacts and conflict risks could amplify and intensify one another227. 
Social exclusion, inequalities, lack of access to the justice system, insufficient inclusion of 
groups into the political system by providing access to participation can, as established in the 
previous chapter, also lead to higher conflict vulnerability. On the one hand this may lead to 
growing inequalities due to different vulnerabilities in social groups as well as different climate 
change impacts in different regions within one country causing the increase of conflict risks228. 
On the other hand, competition between different groups in society over scarce natural 
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resources may increase, which then allows to instrumentalize and exploit the groups’ 
desperation and frustration, due to increasing poverty and inequality in order to recruit and 
mobilize new members for rebel groups, for instance229. 
Apart from the expected interaction and interdependency of climate change impacts and 
conflict relevant political as well as societal conditions economic consequences can also 
suspected. A state’s economy appears to be particularly vulnerable if it relies on the agricultural 
as well as fishery sector since, depending on the extent of climate change, those sectors may 
be hit the hardest hence significant loss can be expected230. 
Moreover, sea level rise, droughts and extreme weather events can destroy or at least damage 
the tourist sector and infrastructures231. On top of that, the demand for energy may increase in 
order to provide cooling systems that are needed to cope with temperature increase232. These 
economic consequences can result in higher unemployment and more poverty which may put 
more pressure the public budget decreasing adaptive capacities, undermining institutional 
functions and therefore political stability233. 
Furthermore, experts expect climate change impacts to specifically put weaker members of 
society at risk with regards to human health. This includes higher risks of malaria, cholera, 
limited access to clean water and food, or direct threats such as heat waves, storms, and floods. 
If a state cannot provide necessary public health conditions it could cause the breakdown of 
social contract resulting in higher vulnerability and social instability234. 
In summary, the repercussions of climate change could impact conflict relevant factors such as 
social, economic, and political conditions; it may also present a threat to human health. It is 
important to emphasize that weak and unstable states, which may be further weakened by 
climate change in several ways, play a crucial role regarding the potential outbreak of violent 
conflict. Hereby, the intensity of climate change impacts, a society’s problem solving ability, 
and the exposure to climate change determines a country’s vulnerability. 
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4.2.2. WATER SCARCITY 
 
Water cannot be substituted with anything and is therefore essential for survival. 
Simultaneously, it is a key resource in the industrial and agricultural sector as well as in private 
households, however, threatened by overuse, pollution, global overpopulation, and lastly 
climate change235. 
In 2009 there were 1.1 billion poeple without access to clean drinking water236 (messner 2009 
p170, wbgu p85 2007). The WHO states that in 2015 “[g]lobally, at least 2 billion people use 
a drinking water source contaminated with faeces”237.  
It can be differentiated between hydrological water scarcity and economic water scarcity. The 
former refers to the lack of water supply although relevant technologies are available and used 
efficiently whereas the latter can be traced back to the lack or failure of institutional and 
financial capacities which affects the access to water (ibid). Hydrological water scarcity can 
mostly be found in Northern Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia which will increase due 
to climate change and probably also affect Southern Africa, Latin America, and small 
islands238. Changing precipitation patterns and increasing precipitation variability also affect 
water availability. Moreover, water evaporation, caused by higher temperatures, will increase 
and therefore the amount of available water will decrease. Although there will be an increase 
in glacial melt and thus river flow leading to greater risk of flooding in the long term it will, 
however, the runoff is expected to decline and result in water scarcity in the affected 
regions239).         
Furthermore, existing water management systems may not be capable to cope with climate 
change induced changes. On the hand, necessary adaptation measures could fail leading to 
rapid changes in demand and supply due to insufficient institutional capacities. On the other 
hand, water management plans could not be executed adequately since past experiences are not 
reliable and applicable anymore240. Water crises leading to conflict are in fact not caused due 
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to lack of water but due to failing management thereof which includes effective adaptation. In 
addition, socioeconomic and political factors as well as societal and political stability crucially 
determine whether a water crisis turns into a water conflict241. 
Particularly social discrimination regarding access to clean water can exacerbate social 
conflicts. Such distribution conflicts may take place between social groups and within the 
business as well as administrative sector242. Prompt access denial as a result of privatization 
and restructuring processes as well as infrastructure projects, such as building dams, can also 
trigger violence243. 
Since water is indispensable resource and essential for survival it is consequently under threat 
of politicization. This may either lead to a ‘blame game’ in order to identify the responsible 
source for failing water supply or it can worsen tensions between social and ethnic groups due 
to politically and ideological motivated water distribution244. Simultaneously, economies rely 
on water as a necessary resource for maintenance and development. Accordingly, limited water 
availability can worsen socioeconomic development as well as the standard increasing tensions 
within society245. Even without taking climate change impacts into account there is a 
probability of violent protest or conflict which could be observed in India between people in 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu where violent conflict over water from the river Kaveri took place 
in 1991246. In Kenya 100 people died following a dispute between two villages over the access 
to a well in 2005247.  
Although water issues have the potential to cause tensions between states, however, interstate 
or international water wars due to climate change are unlikely to happen. On the one hand 
renewable resources such as water are not attractive enough to cause armed conflict for they 
do not immediately lead to power248; on the other hand there has been a certain level of 
agreement that solutions are more likely to be found through cooperation whereas the costs of 
war are higher than measures to improve water supply249. Therefore conflicts over the usage of 
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border crossing water sources mainly create peaceful and trustworthy agreements as well as 
fairly resilient collaborations250. The ‘Indus Water Treaty’ of 1960 between India and Pakistan, 
for example, had survived two wars and several political conflicts without water being 
exploited as a bargaining chip251. The ‘Nil Basin Initiative’ has also served as proof for 
collaboration between the ten affected states252. 
 
 
4.2.3. FOOD INSECURITY 
 
A changing climate accompanied by extreme weather events can also have negative effects on 
agricultural productivity and thus affect food security. Environmental degradation, due to 
desertification, salinization and limited freshwater supply, can create restrictions in the 
agricultural sector. Furthermore, greater evaporation caused by temperature increase, severe 
storms and floods, climate induced spread of new germs, as well as a general shift in vegetation 
periods and precipitation changes can impact crops negatively253. 
Hereby, regional food production specifically depends on soil conditions and the resilience as 
well as adaptive capacity of the agricultural system. While a moderate temperature increase of 
2°C may primarily affect agricultural production in the southern hemisphere, an increase of 
4°C could have global impacts254. Countries in which the population strongly depends on 
agriculture are specifically vulnerable to climate change causing soil degradation and declining 
crops. In many developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South East Asia and the 
Pacific region more than half of the population depends on agriculture as the primary sector255. 
Thus, already vulnerable population groups are additionally under threat which can exacerbate 
and spread poverty256. Even entire economies will experience the impacts of decreasing crops. 
While wealthier societies are more able to compensate production loss it is not possible for 
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some countries with less capital to import food for lack of purchasing power. That puts such 
countries at risk as they will feel price fluctuations and dependency even more257. Moreover, 
the building of power plants, as a response to climate change, may compete with food 
production over land use. As power plants are often more lucrative the lack of food including 
its price may increase resulting in greater risk of food insecurity258. However, stronger 
competition of scarce resources such as land and food alone does not cause violent conflict. It 
is primarily the increase of scarcity and not the actual lack of resources that creates social 
tensions259. Further, existing risks of conflict including political, economic, and social factors 
as well as latent conflicts present key causes for the outbreak of violence260. Those risks can be 
exacerbated by an increasing resource scarcity and therefore lead to a higher probability of 
conflict. Land degradation or the loss of jobs can threaten livelihoods and therefore worsen 
people’s standard of living261. The incline in food prices in combination with existing poverty 
also puts livelihoods under threat262. 
Furthermore, the potential for escalation is increased by unequal access to scarce resources263. 
Conflicts can also be caused by changes in income and wealth distribution between groups and 
business sectors, and regions; the reason for that is that some areas and certain ethnic groups 
will be affected more than others264. In addition, people may try to exploit and instrumentalize 
occurring food crises so that certain groups may be blamed and held responsible for the 
situation265. 
Again, whether food crises lead to destabilization or even violence crucially depends on the 
political stability ad governance structures in the relevant country266. However, potential 
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economic loss and damage may weaken states further and affect their problem solving 
capacities and legitimacy negatively. Increasing fluctuations in price also present political and 
strategic challenges which bare risks for a state’s stability267.  
It is expected that conflicts with regard to land caused by food insecurity will primarily occur 
on a local level. Violent disputes due to food scarcity may be limited to urban areas268. Conflicts 
over access to land have already led to violence between pastoralists and farmers in north 
Nigeria, Sudan, and Kenia (Smith & Vivekananda, 2009, S. 9). The next chapter of this 
dissertation examines the case of Sudan in detail. When the price for agricultural resource 
increased drastically during the food crisis in 2008 an outbreak of violence could be observed 
in developing countries killing 60 people in Cameroon, Haiti, Bangladesh and Yemen alone269. 
 
 
4.2.4. EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS 
 
Due to climate change more frequent extreme weather events such as tropical storms, floods, 
landslides and fires are expected. Resulting risks are accompanied by sea level rise and 
deforestation270. In this case a society’s vulnerability is also based on the infrastructure, 
poverty, level of education, economic structure, and density of the population which is why 
especially poor population groups are at greater risk271. 
Nevertheless, developed countries are also under threat with regards to climate induced 
catastrophes as shown in 2005 when tropical storm ‘Katrina‘ caused severe problems in New 
Orleans272. At the same time such disasters “harbour the potential to provoke far-reaching 
social and political changes”273 and if the political stability and governance structures of a 
country are normally in good condition there is usually no potential for inner conflict in the 
case of extreme weather events274. Yet natural disasters can still temporarily cause the collapse 
of state functions on a local level in the case of emergency if necessary conflict resolution 
mechanism are not in place275. 
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Under those circumstances the destabilization of political systems can be traced back to the 
lack of sufficient crisis management which can create discontent and frustration in the 
public276. In order for a situation to escalate into violent conflict there need to be existing 
political tensions and conflicts which may be amplified through additional grievances and the 
lack of proper crisis management. A disproportional use of force by security services as a 
reaction to resulting crime, for example, can also play a role (ibid.). If a weak country 
experiences multiple natural disasters in a row it is specifically prone to a permanent 
destabilization as observed in Haiti in 2004277. 
Along with that extreme weather events can lead to economic loss, impact water availability 
as well as agricultural capacity and thus create further conflict factors. Energy supply relevant 
infrastructures such as power lines oil rigs, for instance, can be damaged and limit, at least in 
temporarily, reliable energy supply278. Finally, extreme weather events can only lead to violent 
conflict if there is a combination of many factors. On the other hand natural disasters can even 
contribute to more cooperation between individuals, groups and states. This could also be 
observed between enemies triggering parties to help each other across border which created 
new possibilities for peace279. 
 
 
4.2.5. MIGRATION 
 
Migration in itself does not have to be a destabilizing factor; in fact, it can rather benefit the 
immigrants as well as the region they migrate to and migrate from280. Countries receiving 
immigrants can, for example, benefit from sustaining a demographical balance, an incline in 
labour force, and thus economic development281.  
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Besides, emigrants who left their country due to political and social grievance are able to 
improve their livelihoods (ibid). According to public discussions and the media in developed 
countries, however, migration is mostly portrayed as a risk for the receiving country282.    
There is only little doubt that migration will increase due to climate change, though, it is only 
one of the possible coping mechanisms as a reaction to the repercussions of climate change283. 
It is important to mention that current projections cannot provide exact or reliable numbers 
regarding the extent of climate induced migration. Available data are highly speculative and 
uncertain and should therefore be interpreted carefully284.  
Environmentally motivated migration caused by extreme weather, environmental degradation, 
and climate change induced conflicts can be understood as a form of adaptation and the seeking 
of security and hope for better living conditions285. However, due to the fact that 
‘environmental change’ does not pose an officially determined cause for refugees migrants 
fleeing for environmental reasons are not called refugees. According to the Convention and 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees a refugee is defined as “someone who is unable or 
unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion”286.  
Apart from that, climate change related migration does not have to be forced but can also take 
place voluntarily; it is primarily expected within state boundaries. Thus, the term climate 
migrant opposed climate refugee appears to be more suitable287. Consequently, climate 
migrants do not enjoy the same protection, according to internatiol law; as refugees288. 
In addition to migration within states it can be expected that people will migrate across borders, 
but first and foremost within the southern hemisphere289. Furthermore, it is predicted that 
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migration from rural to urban areas will increase290. Climate induced migration may only be 
temporarily and regionally limited which is indicated the emigrants hope to return291. 
Social impacts of climate change, such as the degradation of livelihoods due to climate related 
environmental changes can motivate people directly or indirectly to leave their habitat292). The 
nter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the “primary mechanism for inter-agency 
coordination of humanitarian assistance”293 and established “in response to United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance294 
identifies the following causes of climate related movement: “hydrometeorological extreme 
hazard events, [..] environmental degradation and/or slow onset extreme hazard events, […] 
significant permanent losses in state territory as a result of sea level rise etc., [..] armed 
conflict/violence over shrinking natural resources”295. This implies that climate induced 
environmental changes can have direct impacts on human lives and their security through sea 
level rise, extreme weather events, food insecurity or insufficient supply of available drinking 
water, but also indirect effects due to worse living conditions, land degradation, economic loss 
and finally violent conflict and therefore contribute to emigration296. 
Looking at the current state of research it is, however, currently not possible to characterize 
environmentally induced migration as an autonomous cause297. Instead, although it can be 
expected that environmental changes cause stress and increase the pressure to migrate, it takes 
a multitude of causal factors which contribute to the complex demographical and social 
phenomenon of migration298. This includes a society’s adaptive capacities, stability as well as 
socioeconomic, political, and ethnic conditions299. Furthermore, individual factors such the 
level of education, subjective perception of the situation, social network, and the necessary 
economic setup for potential migration play a crucial role300. 
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However, it is questionable whether climate related migration can be seen as a catalyst for 
violent conflict. Here too, there is lack of significant empirical evidence and thus too much 
uncertainty301. Although authors like Gleditsch et al. see migration as one of the plausible 
connections between climate change and violent conflict302, the relationship can still be 
described as highly complex while still in need of connecting components such as political and 
social factors303. 
Even if conflict, due to climate induced migration, is by far not inevitable it, nevertheless, 
seems possible if migration amplifies existing risks and dynamics. On the one hand, the above 
mentioned conflict constellations cannot only cause migration but can also be intensified by 
migration.  
That way competition over scarce goods including water, food, land, jobs, living space, and 
the covering of basic social needs can be exacerbated through migrants304. The reaction of the 
relevant decision makers in the receiving country is thereby crucial. 
Whether immigrants are integrated and granted certain rights or discriminated instead as well 
as held responsible for grievances has a decisive impact on the probability of conflict. This 
goes hand in hand with the receiving countries capability to adapt to challenges and changing 
situations as well as its governance capacities and societal stability305. 
Large-scale immigration can intensify ethnic tensions through changes in a countries ethnic 
makeup causing imbalances and power struggles306. Moreover, if there is no acceptance for 
immigrants, because they may be seen as an additional burden, they could be subject to 
rejection and the intrumentalization of existing problems307.  
An increase of urbanization also leads to higher vulnerability of economically weaker groups. 
The likelihood of violent conflict may also incline in urban areas since immigrants are mostly 
placed in informal settlements surrounding major cities which pose more conflict risks in 
relatively unprotected areas. Immigration into urban areas puts additional pressure on 
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unresolved societal issues, social tensions, and infrastructural deficiencies which can lead to 
violence the destabilization of cities308.  
Studies have shown that the probability of conflict increases when migration happens over a 
short period of time and in an unorganized manner309. With regards to the repercussions of 
climate change such large-scale migration movements can most likely be expected as a reaction 
to extreme weather events and climate induced violent conflict. In this case the possibility of 
violent conflict also depends on the migrants’ experiences with violence. Violence in the 
receiving region seems particularly possible if migrants have experienced violent conflict in 
the past310. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: CLIMATE CHANGE AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
5.1. ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA 
 
According to available significant evidence, as well as clear prognoses, the African continent, 
including its ecosystems and population, will be the main victims to climate change311. At 
second glance however, the situation is rather ambiguous. Data quality as well as regional 
differences complicate the matter. Furthermore, complex interdependencies between climate 
change and land use systems, food insecurity, health, and the different African ecosystems lead 
to major gaps in knowledge and necessary information about causes, forecasts, and predictions. 
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There is still need for more reliable data and research312. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that 
Africa is particularly vulnerable to negative ecological climate change effects313.  
This section illustrates the forecast for the African continent with regards to temperature 
increase, sea level rise, precipitation, and extreme weather events. It needs to be considered 
that projections for precipitation are more difficult to calculate than temperature predictions as 
precipitation is a result of highly complex physical processes whereas temperature is the result 
of a relatively simple heat balance314. At the same time, there are regional differences. Changes 
can specifically be seen in climate models regarding regional precipitation scenarios315. 
Climate models also capture extreme weather events, such as tropical storms, less effectively 
since current climate models have insufficient resolution capacities and the relevant processes 
are non-linear316. 
 Eriksen et al. (2008) estimate an average temperature increase of 0.5°C during the 21st century 
in Africa. However, variations in different regions show that such averages only say little about 
regional specific circumstances in different areas. It is projected that countries with access to 
the Nile will experience a temperature increase of 0.2 to 0.3°C, while Rwanda can expect an 
increase of 0.7 to 0.9°C317. The IPCC on the other hand predicts a global surface temperature 
increase of up to 4°C for the time period between 2080 and 2099 compared to the period 
between 1980 and 1999. Further studies point out regional differences and project that northern 
Africa will experience hotter summers and colder winters while the Sahel zone should expect 
a general temperature increase of up to 5.4°C318. However, scholars and experts agree that there 
certainly will be a temperature increase in Africa which will have negative impacts319. An 
                                                     
312 Cf. Boko, M. et al. (2007): Africa; in: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution 
of Working Group II to the fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Cambridge University Press, p433f. 
313 Ibid.; Basedau, M./ Leidreiter, A. (2011): Der Klimwandel als Ursache von zukünftigen Kriegen im 
subsaharischen Afrika?; in: Brzoska, M. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikte. Versicherheitlichung versus 
präventive Friedenspolitik?, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p203f. 
314 Cf. WBGU (2007): Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel. Springer. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 
p55. 
315 Cf. Basedau, M./ Leidreiter, A. (2011): Der Klimwandel als Ursache von zukünftigen Kriegen im subsaharischen 
Afrika?; in: Brzoska, M. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikte. Versicherheitlichung versus präventive 
Friedenspolitik?, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p203f. 
316 Cf. WBGU (2007): Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel. Springer. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 
p55. 
317 Cf. Eriksen, S. et al. (2008): Climate Change in Eastern and Southern Africa: Impacts, Vulnerability and 
Adaptation. Golabl Environmental Change and Human Security. Report: 2008:2. University of Oslo. Oslo.  
318 Cf. WBGU (2007): Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel. Springer. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 
p56. 
319 ibid.; Basedau, M./ Leidreiter, A. (2011): Der Klimwandel als Ursache von zukünftigen Kriegen im 
subsaharischen Afrika?; in: Brzoska, M. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikte. Versicherheitlichung versus 
präventive Friedenspolitik?, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p203f. 
53 
 
increase of 2°C compared to the pre-industrial area will cause production loss and lead to a 
stronger dependency on food imports in the entire region320.  
Similarly, sea level rise will affect the continent. As elaborated in chapter two it is projected 
that even if mitigation targets were met, sea level will rise by 96cm between 2000 and 2100321. 
If the average temperature increase does not exceed 3°C, which requires even stronger 
mitigation efforts, there will be a sea level rise of approximately 355cm by the year 2300 while 
projections go up to 500cm322. Provided that all emissions were reduced by 2016, sea level 
would have risen from 59cm in 2100 to 131cm in 2300323. It is needless to say that such utopian 
scenario is not realistic anymore; and probably never was. 
Scenarios of drastic sea level rise present challenges to both ecosystems and socioeconomic 
systems which might result in floods in coastal area of Africa, Asia, as well as on islands324. 
Furthermore, a sea level rise in the Mediterranean Sea, for example, can impact the Nile river 
delta and salt groundwater reservoirs affecting major parts of the local population and their 
freshwater supply325. Simultaneously, the costs for adaptation can take up between 5 to 10% 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) and this is extremely problematic for African countries326. 
Additionally, the IPCC projects that sea level rise can result in the decline of mangroves and 
coral reefs which may have severe negative impacts Africa’s fishing and tourist sector327. 
When it comes to precipitation, the long-term forecasts predict a decline in annual rainfall of 
10% by 2050 for sub-Sahara Africa as well as a 20% higher risk of cyclones in east Africa328. 
Moreover, increasing dryness in southern Africa, a 7% higher risk of flooding in east Africa, 
and unpredictable heavy rain fall as well severe storms are likely to occur. This may have 
dangerous impacts on the affected population, albeit different for each relevant society329. 
However, all affected areas will be forced to adapt effectively. The agricultural sector, in 
particular, may have to cope with those consequences as 75% of the sector depend on 
                                                     
320 Ibid. 
321 Cf. Schaeffer et al. (2012): Long-term sea-level rise implied by 1.5°C and 2°C warming levels. Nature Climate 
Change, p2. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Ibid., p4. 
325 Cf. Basedau, M./ Leidreiter, A. (2011): Der Klimwandel als Ursache von zukünftigen Kriegen im subsaharischen 
Afrika?; in: Brzoska, M. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikte. Versicherheitlichung versus präventive 
Friedenspolitik?, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p203f. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Cf. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Ibid. 
54 
 
rainfall330. The resulting loss in agriculturally relevant land and harvest potential could 
compromise food supply and food security strongly whereby food security already poses one 
of the major issues in Africa331. Studies estimate that crop yields decrease by 50% between the 
year 2000 and 2020332. However, the IPCC’s data on crop shortfall in Africa are solely based 
on three northern African states333. Generally, there are great contrasts between the seven 
different climate regions in Africa while there are not enough clear or coherent data334. 
Nonetheless, the so far observed impacts and weather events have caused severe damage in 
numerous African countries335. Thus overall, there is a high probability that climate change 
will have negative ecological impacts on Africa. The climate of the Sahel is already “perhaps 
the most dramatic example of climate variability that we have quantitatively measured 
anywhere in the world”336. Africa’s geographical circumstances, its dependency on agriculture 
and fishery, as well as its populous coastal areas make the continent, not only in the Sahel, 
extremely vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change even if the extent of such 
impacts is not clear yet337.   
 
 
5.2. CONFLICT RELATED RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA 
 
African countries pose high political as well as socioeconomic risks and thus it is very probable 
that they will have great difficulty adapting to the repercussions of climate change338. As 
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examined in Chapter 4, conflict studies have identified multiple factors that promote the 
outbreak of violent conflict339. This includes population, low income per capita, low economic 
growth, weak security and justice systems, dependency on export of natural resources, as well 
as ethnic diversity340. Recent studies suggest that the exclusion of ethnic groups from political 
participation presents a high conflict risk, for example. This also speaks to the quality of state 
institutions, such as their legitimacy and efficiency.  
It is therefore not hard to see that those risks are predominately illustrated in African countries. 
Specifically, low income and weak economies that depend on the export of raw materials are 
typically African phenomena341. Thus with regards to climate change impacts those issues are 
even more alarming. The key problem, however, appears to be the insufficiency or lack of state 
institutions and governance. The World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) show that Africa 
in general342 consistently performs worse than other regions. The Fragile State Index supports 
these findings343. 
In spite of this, it is again important to mention that it is arguably problematic to predict future 
outcomes based on the recent past and present situation. In particular, warnings regarding the 
effects of climate change can and perhaps should lead to a response. Despite the importance of 
adaptation experts need to bear in mind the diversity of the African continent and thus its 
different needs. Governance capacities and state institutions, for instance, are far more 
advanced in the southern part of Africa, such as Botswana, South Africa and Namibia, 
compared to the central, eastern, or western region of the continent. However, there are 
promising examples even in those areas344.   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
339 Dixon, J. (2009): What Causes Civil War? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings; in: International Studies 
Review. 11(4), p707f. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Collier, P./ Hoeffler, A. (2002): On the Incidence of Civil war in Africa; in: Journal of Conflict Resolution. 46(1), 
p13f.  
342 Cf. Basedau, M./ Leidreiter, A. (2011): Der Klimwandel als Ursache von zukünftigen Kriegen im subsaharischen 
Afrika?; in: Brzoska, M. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikte. Versicherheitlichung versus präventive 
Friedenspolitik?, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p203f. 
343 Cf. FFP (2017): Fragile States Index 2017. Fund For Peace. Washington DC. 
344 Cf. Basedau, M./ Leidreiter, A. (2011): Der Klimwandel als Ursache von zukünftigen Kriegen im subsaharischen 
Afrika?; in: Brzoska, M. (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikte. Versicherheitlichung versus präventive 
Friedenspolitik?, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p203f. 
56 
 
5.3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 
The underlying question is still whether there is in fact significant empirical evidence regarding 
the link between climate change and violent conflict. The scientific as well as conflict literature 
offers a wide range of future scenarios and how vulnerable societies, specifically in Africa, can 
be affected. However, there is still doubt about the exact impacts of climate change as well as 
the extent and intensity of it, including its consequences for African societies. Yet it is expected 
that resource scarcity and their degradation, which is predicted to be worsened by climate 
change, will contribute to the outbreak of violence in Africa significantly. This section as well 
as the following paragraphs focus on the actual empirical evidence, ‘anecdotal’ and 
quantitative, found in the literature before exploring the case of Darfur in detail. 
 
 
Map of Sudan and South Sudan345 
 
According to some ‘anecdotal’ evidence specific cases have been described as ‘climate 
induced’ wars or conflicts. For example, the Tuareg conflict in Mali, Tigray conflict in 
Ethiopia, and the infamous Darfur conflict in Sudan have been linked to environmental 
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degradation346. The conflict in Darfur has even been described as a ‘climate war’ which is 
further examined in this chapter.  
Before briefly illustrating a few studies and their quantitative evidence, it is crucial to repeat 
that violent conflict is not caused by a single factor but rather a combination of multiple factors 
which were clarified in Chapter three.  
Africa specific quantitative studies mainly identify low income, dependency on natural 
resources, and dysfunctional political institutions as risks for violent conflict347. In the recent 
past political exclusion of ethnic groups has been added to the list of risk factors (wimmer 
2009). However, this does certainly not mean that environmental factors do not play a role. 
There is an increasing number of contemporary studies that include ecological factors and their 
effect on the development of violent conflict in Africa348.  
 Quantitative studies, such as Miguel et al. (2004), analyzes the effects of precipitation and 
determined that little rainfall increases the probability of civil war in Africa significantly349. 
Ciccone (2008) uses the same data and comes to the conclusion that an incline in rainfall 
increases the probability of violent conflict350. It is worth mentioning that although the 
correlation, albeit significant, is not strong351. Furthermore, it is based on a ‘country-bias’ 
which means entire countries are considered although environmental conditions within one 
country may differ, especially in large-area states in Africa352. 
Burke et al. (2009) use so-called ‘grid cells’ in order to examine the same research question. 
‘Grid cells’ are arbitrarily set squares, approximately 50km times 50km, which are used for 
subnational analyses353. Even if the arbitrary determination of ‘grid cells’ may be criticized it 
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still has got the advantage of not including a political bias354. Burke et al.’s results show that a 
temperature increase of 1°C between 1982 and 2002 had led to a 59% higher probability of 
“civil war onset” which implies at least 1000 deaths355. The authors project that by 2030 civil 
wars in Africa will increase by 60% while 450,000 additional deaths can be expected356.  
However, this study has been criticized357 as contextual conditions are not included adequately. 
Theisen et al. (2009) on the other hand use sub-national ‘grid cells’ while also taking contextual 
factors into account. They particularly emphasize the political exclusion of ethnic based on the 
data from Cedermann et al. (2010)358. Theisen at al. come to the result that low rainfall rates or 
droughts have no systematic effect on the probability of civil war if the marginalization of 
ethnic groups is taken into account. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that climate change and 
its repercussions may not increase the probability of civil war but rather have severe impacts 
on local low intensity conflicts, such as conflicts between herders or farmers. In fact, there have 
been several deadly disputes in Kenya and in the Sahel which most database do not capture359.    
In summary, so far there is still little evidence that climate change will increase the number of 
violent conflicts. However, this does not mean it does not contribute as one of the multiple 
factors. Additionally, new studies and data may justify different outcomes; further it needs to 
be considered that the link between climate change and violent conflict is not linear, i.e. future 
climate change effects could be of such high intensity causing a disproportional increase of 
violence. This may start a so far unknown dynamic. 
 
 
 
 
5.4. THE CASE OF DARFUR 
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When the literature refers to ‘climate induced’ violent conflict Darfur is one of the first 
examples, if not the most common one. And indeed, it is what comes to mind when linking 
extreme environmental conditions to violence. As indicated in Chapter one and in the previous 
section, this thesis explores the war in Darfur as a case study of the causal relationship between 
climate change and violent conflict. Many scholars as well as public debates and the media 
often refer to the armed conflict, which escalated into a genocide in 2003, as a so-called climate 
war360. However, it is questionable if that term is used adequately as it offers two main 
problematic implications. On the one hand, violent conflicts can never be traced back to one 
single cause361 even if discussions during the Cold War interpreted some armed conflicts as so-
called proxy wars362. In the last two decades various conflicts have been referred to as oil wars 
or resource wars and have therefore oversimplified the matter as such terminology does not do 
the diversity of conflict causes justice363.  
Describing the case of Darfur as a climate war is based on two different trends, albeit occurring 
at the same time. On the one hand precipitation has decreased since the end of the 1960s in 
Darfur. On the other hand the number and intensity of armed conflict has increased for the 
same period of time364. In order to examine that correlation this section aims to summarize the 
conflict history of Darfur. 
 
 
5.4.1. DARFUR’S CONFLICT HISTORY 
 
The open armed conflict in Darfur began in 2003 when rebels, known as the Darfur Liberation 
Front (DLF), gained control over parts of the region. In April they attacked military bases in 
al-Faschir, the capital of the province North Darfur, a direct provocation to the government. 
The name of the rebel group indicates that there had been tensions between the power centre 
and its outskirts in the country365. Up until colonial times Darfur had enjoyed a special statues 
as it was only conquered by British troops in 1916. The west of Sudan had been excluded from 
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political participation and power and thus stayed underdeveloped. In contrast to the south, 
however, the west and east acted accordingly to the major parties in the north366. 
Changing the name from Darfur Liberation Front to Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A) points out the connection rebels from the south as part of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) who worked together with regime opponents in Darfur 
to increase the pressure on the government367. Hereby rebels from Darfur received support with 
regards to military and ideological training, yet it can be argued how close exactly the ties 
between the SLM/A and the SPLM/A were368. The SLM/A could particularly identify with 
SPLM/A’s idea of a New Sudan which included the establishment of a federal system.  
The SLM/A recruits came from mainly two sources: for one, school and university graduates 
from Darfur who had completed their education in the capital Khartum or in other major cities 
of west Sudan, however, had to face discrimination with regards to finding employment. 
Despite the same qualifications graduates from central north Sudan were given preference369. 
Secondly, the SLM/A was able to organize experienced militants who had fought in local 
militias. In Darfur such militias had gained increasing importance for the past decades and 
progressively formed a division between ‘Arabic’ versus ‘African’ groups whereas specifically 
the term ‘Arabic’ is based on cultural rather than ethnic aspects370. The SLM/A was made up 
of three major ethnic groups: the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa. The opposing militia 
named, Dschandscjawid, consisted of ‘Arabic’ herders from multiple different ethnic groups. 
Later that year the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) entered the conflict whose leaders 
were mainly from the ethnic Zaghawa. It is important to mention that JEM is in fact affiliated 
with the Muslim brotherhood, although it has been denied by the militant group371.  
Armed conflicts are not a new phenomenon in Darfur, however, there has been an incline in 
the number of intense conflicts since the 1960s and again since 1987372. At the same time, there 
was no obvious pattern with regards to a conflict trend between ‘Arabic’ and ‘African’ as it is 
the current distinction in the war. Up until 1990 the armed disputes had taken place in South 
Sudan where fights took place between nomadic herders, primarily consisting of stealing kettle 
and camels while there were also disputes between settled farmers and herders. The conflict 
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issue of the latter was mainly related to land use373. However, two conflicts stand out. On the 
one hand, the so-called war between ‘Arabs’ and the Fur from 1987 to 1989 causing thousands 
of deaths and thus more than the total number of violent conflicts had caused until the start of 
the war in 2003374. Furthermore, the battles escalated into a war over territorial conquests while 
ethnic prejudices formed the conflict further375.  
The second severe conflict took place between ‘Arabs’ and Masalit from 1995 to 1999. Here 
too, with a number of approximately 700 victims, it was more deadly than most of the past 
conflicts. In this case the government supported the ‘Arabic’ party which is of significant 
relevance for the further development of the conflict. Such support included but was not limited 
to the provision and delivery of weapons. Additionally, this particular conflict can be 
characterized as the beginning of the organization Dschandschawid376, even certain militias 
had appeared under that name before.  
Sudan’s political situation is shaped by a shift from elected governments to militant regimes. 
For a long time the parliament was dominated by two parties which both originated from the 
Muslim brotherhood and were each led by a single family. Darfur’s elections had always been 
dominated by the Umma party, however, a split within the party into two wings led to the inner 
ethnic distinction between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’ prior to the elections of 1968 which was also 
reflected with regards to the voters377. This development was stopped due to a military coup 
d’état in 1969378. During the mid-1980s the military regime, led by Dschafar al-Numeiri, was 
put under increasing pressure which the regime tried to solve through the politics of 
regionalization and declared different regions, such as Darfur, as its own Province. 
Nevertheless, this tactic still caused more turmoil Darfur. Where there were traditional systems 
in place disputes would now be handled by the regional administration. For one, land rights 
were changed causing issues between settled farmers and nomadic herders. When fighting over 
land use the former referred to traditional/ customary law whereas the latter referred to public 
law379. Furthermore, the regional administration started to interfere more often when conflicts 
arose giving less room for traditional justice systems and conflict resolution mechanisms; such 
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‘new’ forms of conflict resolution did not pose a real alternative to customary measures380. 
Darfur was the only region which was not governed by someone from the region. Only after 
protests hat taken place the first local governor was appointed381. Another severe consequence 
of the political regionalization was the permanent and rising competition over vacancies within 
the regional administration382. After the overthrow of Numeiris in 1986 and with a new 
government in power this competition was even more intensified. In 1987 for the first time a 
new movement with the name Arab Gathering criticized the alleged discrimination of ‘Arabs’ 
in Darfur and demanded privileges instead383. Towards the end of the 1980s muslim brothers 
increased their activities in the north and primarily focused on the ideological distinction of 
‘Arabs’ versus ‘Africans’384. Up until then the Muslim brotherhood was represented by the 
Islamic Charter Front (ICF) and later on the National Islamic Front (NIF), a relatively small 
party. Yet, it was represented disproportionally in parliament due to an exception in the 
Sudanese electoral law which allowed the military, administrative, as well as educational elite 
to elect additional representatives besides regular elections385. In 1989 another military coup 
d’état put an end to this parliamentary phase and made the Muslim brothers the decisive force 
in Sudan386. In the following years during the 1990s ‘Arabs’ were openly preferred and 
privileged in Darfur. This was possibly connected to the conflict in South Sudan. In order to 
prevent attacks from the SPLM/A ‘Arabic’ militias were placed on the border between Darfur 
and South Sudan. From the mid-1990s such ‘Arabic’ militias were directly supported by the 
government387. Along with further regionalization processes Darfur was divided into three 
provinces in 1994. As a primary result the ‘African’ Fur lost their relative majority in the Darfur 
population despite being the strongest ethnic group in the region388. When in 1999 the central 
government was split between president Omar al-Bashir and the Muslim brotherhood leader 
Hassan al-Turabi, who was also popular with ‘Non-Arabs’ in Darfur, tensions among the ethnic 
groups in Darfur intensified389. It’s worth mentioning that former Muslim brotherhood 
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supporters were also responsible for the so-called Black Book which documented the 
dominance of the ‘Arabic’ population compared to all other groups in Sudan390.  
Another crucial reason for the armed conflict in Darfur can be traced back into 1960s when the 
first Chadian rebel group was founded in Darfur391. That group, such as later Chadian rebels, 
used Darfur as an exile. In 1991 the Chadian president, Idris Déby, managed to get into power 
while staying in Darfur. There are two reasons why Darfur was involved in the conflicts in 
Chad. Firstly, the border between Chad and Sudan separated the settlement areas between 
multiple ethnic groups392; a phenomenon that is not new to the African continent. In the case 
of the Darfur war this specifically refers to the Zaghawa which is also the ethnic group that 
Déby belongs to. Parts of the Chadian Zaghawa fled from the war in Chad while others escaped 
the drought in the early 1970s, all finding refuge in Darfur393. Secondly, the political relations 
between Chad and Sudan were often strained so that over time different Sudanese governments 
supported different Chadian rebels394. Those tensions were put under even more stress when 
Libya intervened, marching through Darfur, to fulfil their interests in Chad, which included 
territorial interests regarding the Azouazou strip as well as the establishment of an Arabic-
Islamic government395. In order to accomplish that Libya’s President Muammar Gaddafi 
formed a  Islamic Legion which was meant to promote Islamification and Arabization in 
African states. Militants for the Islamic legion were mainly mobilized from Sudan and Chad 
followed by supporting them with weapons396.  
However, Libya did not only use Sudan to intervene in Chad but also had the opportunity to 
influence Sudanese politics by providing exile to the Sudanese political opposition throughout 
the several military coup d’états. This allowed Gaddafi to get closer to his ideological dream 
of the ‘Islamification’ and ‘Arabization’ of Africa397. 
 
 
5.4.2. CLIMATE CHANGE IN DARFUR 
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Darfur’s conflict history has also been shaped by its history of severe droughts in 1913, 1940, 
1973, and 1984 although the first half of the 20th century had started off with an unusual amount 
of rainfall, specifically in the 1950s and 1960s398. However, the following two decades were 
characterized by long period of drought before the climate became wetter again399.  
During the actual droughts there were only limited armed disputes400. The years after that, yet, 
displayed a certain form of banditry consisting of kettle and camel theft among herders whereas 
the droughts of 1973 and 1984 caused conflicts different from the traditional pattern401. 
The distribution of relief supplies was now substantially influenced by political decisions. In 
the beginning of the 1970s the Chadian government was distributing food and supplies form 
other countries, however, with insufficient support for the north followed by thousands of 
Chadians migration to Sudan and complicating the situation in dry Darfur even further402. 
In the mid-1980s it was clearly the Sudanese government that was responsible for the problems 
with regards to dealing with the repercussions of the drought as it simply denied the fact that 
there was a drought in Darfur403. When the situation became more intense and the government 
in Khartum finally responded it was incapable to distribute relief aid effectively. This presented 
another opportunity for Libya to expand its influence in Sudan by supporting the distribution 
of food and other aid in Darfur404. 
The main reason why the current war in Darfur has been labelled as a climate war probably 
lies in the above-mentioned correlation between the decrease in precipitation and the increase 
of conflicts from the 1970s to the 1990s. The literature has described the case of Darfur as one 
of the first examples for ecologically induced conflicts405. The debate on the link between 
climate change and the conflict in Darfur was rekindled in 2007 when Faris’ article with the 
title The Real Roots of Darfur was published by The Atlantic406. Up until then the media had 
primarily referred to the war as conflict between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’. Faris on the other 
hand puts emphasis on a conflict between settled farmers and nomadic herders407. However, 
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unlike de Waal, he identifies the above mentioned decrease in precipitation as a direct cause 
for the increase in violent conflicts since the 1980s408.  
Furthermore, former UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon links food and water scarcity to the 
conflict in Darfur, along with that “the violence in Somalia grows from a similarly volatile mix 
of food and water insecurity. So do the troubles in Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso”409. He 
literally refers to Faris claiming that “[i]t is no accident that the violence in Darfur erupted 
during the drought. Until then, Arab nomadic herders had lived amicably with settled farmers. 
A recent Atlantic Monthly article by Stephan Faris describes how black farmers would 
welcome herders as they crisscrossed the land, grazing their camels and sharing wells. But once 
the rains stopped, farmers fenced their land for fear it would be ruined by the passing herds. 
For the first time in memory, there was no longer enough food and water for all. Fighting broke 
out. By 2003, it evolved into the full-fledged tragedy we witness today”410. In the same year 
Albert Arnold (Al) Gore Jr. in 2007 received the Nobel Peace Prize for the documentary ‘An 
inconvenient truth’ and for his political action with regards to climate change, together with 
the IPCC for its “outstanding scientific work”411. The Nobel Committee inter alia argued that 
“global warming not only has negative consequences for ‘human security’, but can also fuel 
violence and conflict within and between states […]The consequences are most obvious, 
however, among the poorest of the poor, in Darfur and in large sectors of the Sahel belt, where 
we have already had the first ‘climate war’”412.  
Welzer (2008) has examined the link between climate change and conflict in a broader sense 
while also referring to Darfur413.  According to the author “there have been conflicts for seventy 
or more between Darfur’s settled farmers (‘Africans’) and nomadic herdsmen (‘Arabs’), but 
they have become increasingly severe as a result of soil erosion and greater livestock 
numbers”414. Along with naming the disastrous droughts and its social impacts throughout the 
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20th century he concludes that “we see quite clearly that climate-induced changes were the 
starting point for the conflict”415.  
Nonetheless, the argumentation that climate change alone is the actual cause for the violent 
conflict in Darfur poses weaknesses. When Faris criticizes the term ‘ethnic conflict’ for 
reducing a conflict to one single cause, he in fact commits the same mistake by emphasizing 
that climate change as one factor416. Furthermore, he tends to idealize the relationship between 
farmers and herders prior to the drought of the 1980s: “[u]ntil the rains began to fail, the 
sheikh’s people lived amicably with the settled farmers. The nomads were welcome passers-
through, grazing their camels on the rocky hillsides that separated the fertile plots. The farmers 
would share their wells, and the herders would feed their stock on the leavings from the harvest. 
But with the drought, the farmers began to fence off their land—even fallow land—for fear it 
would be ruined by passing herds. A few tribes drifted elsewhere or took up farming, but the 
Arab herders stuck to their fraying livelihoods—nomadic herding was central to their cultural 
identity”417. This reference also provided the ground for Ban ki-Moon’s statement418. 
Although Welzer bases his argumentation on a longer analysis of Darfur’s conflict history he, 
despite identifying multiple influencing conflict factors, surprisingly and uncritically still 
comes to the conclusion that climate change was the key factor for the escalation419. He, too, 
underestimates Darfur’s long conflict history as well as the several political changes and 
challenges for the country. The reason why people increasingly started taking up arms in the 
last three decades cannot solely be traced back to environmental reasons. Instead the escalation, 
worsened by the increasing distribution of weapons and thus a greater number of deaths, should 
be seen as a result of a complexity of multiple factors420.  
Several scholars and organizations define conflicts that are substantially influenced by 
environmental degradation, the destruction of natural resources, and climate change, as 
‘environmentally induced’ conflicts which, just like that, takes away the multi-layered 
complexity of violent conflict. Taking this into account the number of environmental conflicts 
since the 1980s shoots up drastically421.  
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Determining one single factor as the cause of violent conflict is simply not valid and can lead 
to a trivialization of violent conflict. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that environmental 
factors, including climate change, have an influence, may it be direct or indirect, on society 
and can definitively contribute or even intensify violent conflict422.  
A closer look at Darfur’s history of conflict and escalation shows plausibly that the war in 
Darfur would have also emerged without climate change as an influential factor423. As a result, 
in reverse, scholars argue that climate change impacts alone would have not been enough to 
cause such escalation424. Instead, the contribution of other key factors, such as the politicization 
of major parts of the population along with the ethnic aspect of ‘Arabic’ versus ‘African’, the 
availability and accessibility of weapons, as well as Libya’s political influence decisively 
characterizes the war in Darfur. Thus labelling the conflict in Darfur as a so-called ‘climate 
war’ is not justified.  
However, it is questionable whether the situation in Darfur, even if not entirely a ‘climate war’, 
can serve as a proven scenario for future predictions in Africa. Despite the WBGU’s identifying 
“three major areas in which climate change is expected to cause critical developments, namely 
the depletion of freshwater resources, the impairment of food production, and an increase in 
weather extremes. Also, as an indirect consequence of these developments, migration may 
increase in the affected regions”425, such information has to be examined carefully since there 
is still great uncertainty as to what extent migration and other societal impacts will take place.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, this dissertation has pointed out that in contrast to previous debates, 
contemporary discussions put emphasis on the impacts that climate change has on human lives. 
Yet, it is controversial to what extent environmental degradation as well as climate change play 
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a role in the specific context of violent conflict426. Reports by the IPCC present a solid base for 
the international climate debate which is accepted and supported by a majority of academic 
experts427. Nonetheless, there is significant ambiguity about what negative consequences 
climate change could pose for peaceful human co-existence428. 
In 2007, specifically, it was brought to public attention that the effects of a warming climate, 
such as more intense storms, floods and droughts have severe impacts on the human-wellbeing, 
especially in more vulnerable areas of the globe429. Experts even claimed that, in many parts 
of the world, climate change would cause dramatic impacts in the form of violent conflicts due 
to the decrease of drinking water, fertile soil as well as food. Entire states might be weakened 
and societies could collapse which might lead to severe consequences for conflict resolution 
institutions and mechanisms, human security as well as migration430. However, from a conflict 
studies point of view every single statement above is arguable431. Findings regarding the 
impacts of climate change on violent conflict are highly controversial432 and sometimes even 
contradictory433.  
 
When the IPCC published its fourth assessment report in 2007 climate change gained an 
immense amount of public attention434. Since then, the quality of data as well as evidence has 
continued to improve with every report and it can be assured now that there are significant 
climate science data available435. 
It is now widely accepted that the main cause of global warming and thus climate change can 
be traced back to human activity436. The amount of carbon dioxide, the crucial component of 
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the so-called greenhouse gas which causes global warming, is primarily produced from the 
combustion of carbonaceous fossil fuels in order to generate energy. The current amount is 
higher than it has been in the last eight centuries. In fact, the trend shows an increase in the 
amount of carbon dioxide. The IPCC predicts, given that no effective counter-measures are 
undertaken, a temperature increase of up to 6.4°C by 2100. Contemporary studies show that 
greenhouse gas emissions are already causing permanent and intensive changes in our 
environment. Scientists have warned that climate change does not happen gradually, instead 
abrupt and irreversible climate change impacts can be the consequence once a certain 
temperature increase is exceeded437. 
However, specifically future climate models show that there is still strong uncertainty about 
future predictions although there has been a substantial amount of climate research. 
Nevertheless, experts from all disciplines argue that climate change will have severe 
implications for societies as well economies including water availability, food security, and 
health438. Those factors may contribute to the development of violent conflict439. 
 
Conflicts in general are inevitable and a necessary by-product of social change, however, it is 
a question of how they are handled and resolved440.It cannot be stressed enough that the 
outbreak of violent conflict is not limited to one single cause but is often based on a 
combination of factors. There are multiple reasons for violent conflict which do not occur 
isolated from other influences441. GSDRC, those causes can be divided into political and 
institutional factors, identity politics, socioeconomic factors, and resource and environmental 
factors which include climate change, environmental insecurity and resource scarcity442. 
 
Chapter three focused on the violence literature and has illustrated that weak state institutions 
are seen as one of the reasons for violent conflict as societies can be fractured if political 
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institutions are not able to manage different group interests peacefully, protect certain groups, 
or provide opportunities for political participation443. There is a degree of consensus among 
social scientists that there is a connection between levels of democracy and the probability of 
violent conflict in a society444. Stable democracies are more able to cope with tensions 
peacefully whereas authoritarian regimes tend to manage conflict through force and violence.  
With regards to identity aspects of conflict causes it is important to note that politics referring 
to ethnicity or religion promote exclusion or violence. Although identity can contribute to 
issues of power as well as of grievance, it can also be used peacefully in order to promote 
inclusion and empowerment through the claiming of rights and citizenship445.  
Furthermore, it is not rare that different forms of inequalities, exclusion and marginalization 
interact and exacerbate each other. Accordingly, unequal access to power and decision-making 
processes can lead to unequal access to natural resources and land, for instance. Exclusion 
based on social identity, may it be perceived or actual, can result in a strong feeling of collective 
injustice and increase a group’s sense of alienation from the majority of society and therefore 
cause frustration and resentment. Over time, such tensions can foster group mobilisation and 
fuel violent conflict446. However, such relative deprivation does not only affect excluded and 
marginalized groups but also the privileged who fear losing their status quo. One of the critical 
factors which decides whether discontent and resentment turns into violence is the 
government’s response. The states responsibility is then to address exclusion instead of reacting 
unreasonably to a peaceful protest, for example, in order to prevent violent outbreaks447. 
Moreover, there is an obvious and clear connection between poverty and violent conflict; yet 
most scholars claim that poverty per se is rarely a direct cause of conflict. Instead it is mainly 
relative deprivation that increases the probability of violent conflict. On the other hand, poverty 
can certainly contribute or maintain conflict due to its link to the perception of injustices, 
exclusion, as well as marginalization448. 
All these aspects play a crucial role for the development of violent conflict. The focus of this 
dissertation, however, are environmentally, and thus climate change, related conflict risks. This 
has been examined in its own chapter. Generally, the debate on the link between climate change 
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and violent conflict can be understood as a continuation of the environmental security debate 
which includes the issue of violent conflict in the context of environmental change449. 
Environmental degradation is mostly seen as only one of the contributing factors in a 
combination of multiple causes of violent conflict. Environmental degradation, in itself, does 
not directly result in violence. The deciding factors are primarily of political, social, and 
economic nature, as examined in chapter three of this dissertation. However, these causes may 
be influenced or exacerbated by environmental changes450. 
 
The empirically found connections between climate change and violent conflict are often 
relatively small, yet due to the expected repercussions of climate change such connections may 
become more significant. Currently, climate related relationships are still based on uncertainty 
as it is not useful to refer to historically empirical analysis451.  
At the same time the debate on security and peace is fairly new in the climate change context. 
Thus, the process of linking those fields and projection societal risks as a consequence of 
climate change is only in its early stages. It is important to not jump to conclusions but rather 
interpret information carefully nor should, despite the limited data, a link between climate 
change and violent conflict be negated or denied452. 
In addition, the vulnerability to climate change as well as to conflict plays a crucial role. 
Moreover, a society’s stability as well as the ability to adapt to climate change are decisive in 
order to prevent conflict453. 
                                                     
449 Cf. Breitmeier, H. (2009): Klimawandel und Gewaltkonflikte. Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, 
Osnabrück, p17; WBGU (2007): Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel. Springer. 
Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, p27; Scheffran, J. (2011): Globaler Klimawandel und Gewaltkonflikte: Befunde und 
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Versicherheitlichung versus präventive Friedenspolitik?, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p33. 
450 Ibid.  
451 Cf. Nordås, R./ Gleditsch, N. P. (2005): Climate Conflict: Common Sense or Nonsense? PRIO. Oslo, p5. 
452 Cf. Brzoska, M./ Oels, A. (2011): ´Versicherheitlichung‘ des Klimawandels? Die Konstruktion des 
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At the same time adaptation pressures and other challenges due to climate change impacts can 
weaken states and make them more vulnerable454. Along with the amplifying effect of existing 
conflict risks water scarcity, conflicts over land, food insecurity, extreme weather events, and 
climate induced migration can be expected to fuel potential conflict constellations. Climate 
change can lead to natural resource scarcity which can result in poverty and social tensions and 
thus increases conflict risks455. 
As established in chapter five, the African continent including its ecosystems and population 
will be the main victims to climate change456. Furthermore, African countries pose high 
political as well as socioeconomic risks and thus it will very probable that they will have great 
difficulty to adapt to the repercussions of climate change457. Despite the importance of climate 
change adaptation experts need to bear in mind the diversity of the African continent and thus 
its different needs. 
In summary, so far there is still little evidence that climate change will increase the number of 
violent conflicts. However, this does not mean it does not exacerbate or contribute to violent 
conflict as one of the multiple factors. Additionally, new studies and data may justify different 
outcomes; further it needs to be considered that the link between climate change and violent 
conflict is not linear, i.e. future climate change effects could be of such high intensity causing 
a disproportional increase of violence. This may start a so far unknown dynamic. 
 
Finally, a closer look at Darfur’s history of conflict and escalation shows plausibly that the war 
in Darfur would have also emerged without climate change as an influential factor458. And, in 
reverse, scholars argue that climate change impacts alone would have not been enough to cause 
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such escalation. Instead, the contribution of other key factors, such as the politicization of major 
parts of the population along with the ethnic aspect of ‘Arabic’ versus ‘African’, the availability 
and accessibility of weapons, as well as Libya’s political influence decisively characterizes the 
war in Darfur459. Following this, it is argued that labelling the conflict in Darfur as a so-called 
‘climate war’ is not justified.  
 
In short, the little amount of data exposes the lack of research in the interdisciplinary filed of 
climate change and violent conflict causes too much uncertainty in order to come to 
unambiguous conclusions, let alone recommendations. This thesis has clarified that a link can 
be made between climate change and violent conflict. However, from available data it is not 
strong or direct enough to reduce violent conflict to a mono-causal issue or the term ‘climate 
war’, which implies exactly that. By doing so a violent conflict gets rather oversimplified thus 
‘climate war’ is not a justifiable description. However, it would be irresponsible to ignore 
climate change in the conflict debate since it is the biggest and possibly most relevant 
environmental change that humankind has been challenged with460. Nevertheless, alarmist 
prognoses as well as transforming climate change into a pure security threat should be avoided; 
nor should climate change in that matter be denied or trivialized. 
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